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ARTICLES
LEGAL TRANSITIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF
RELIANCE
David M. Hasen*
This Article analyzes the literature on legal
transitions. The principal focus is taxation, but the
analysis generalizes to other areas. I argue that the
theoretical apparatus developed by scholars active in the
legal transitions area suffers from significant conceptual
shortcomings.
These shortcomings include the
unwarranted assimilation of legal to factual change, the
naturalization of conventional arrangements, and the
disregard of the distinction between making law and
finding it. As a consequence, the recent literature offers an
analysis that is unable either to explain actual transitions
or to provide an adequate theory of how legal change
should take place. In the end, the older view of legal
transitions is more capable than the newer one of
providing an adequate normative and positive framework
for understanding legal transitions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The academic literature on legal transitions has grown substantially
over the last twenty-five years.1 Its subject is the proper timing of legal
change: When a new legal rule is announced, what rules or norms should
govern the time at which the rule comes into force? Further, what relief, if
any, should be made available to those who suffer an unexpected loss from
the change, and what charge, if any, should be imposed upon those who
enjoy an unanticipated windfall from it?2 If Congress passed legislation
1. Seminal treatments include those of Michael Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case
of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977) [hereinafter Graetz,
Legal Transitions], and Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow, Economic Analysis]. More recently, Daniel
Shaviro has provided a comprehensive analysis of legal transitions with an emphasis on tax
transitions. See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000). Additional extensive
discussion is found in 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, the first issue of which compiles papers
delivered at a symposium on legal transitions.
2. See Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP.
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tomorrow raising the top marginal tax bracket to seventy percent, should
that rate apply only to income earned from tomorrow forward; only to
income earned from some later date forward; or to some income already
earned as well as to income yet to be earned? Further, would it be
appropriate to offer relief to taxpayers who planned the timing of their
income on the assumption that the old marginal brackets would persist for
some period of time?
One of the notable features of the recent transitions literature is the
consequentialist orientation it has adopted in answering these questions.3
Rather than focus on the fairness or reliance aspects of various possible
transition rules, scholars currently active in the area have typically adopted
an anticipations-oriented approach that focuses on the efficiency
consequences of various possible transition norms. From this perspective,
the transition question becomes: What set of expectations about the
effective date of future, as yet unknown changes to legal rules and about
possible “transition relief” produces socially optimal pre-transition conduct
among individuals who will be affected by such changes? The general
answers upon which scholars writing in the area have settled are that norms
of immediate effect (or, in some cases, earlier) and no transition relief
produce optimal results.4
Consistent with this orientation, the recent literature has taken as
broad a perspective as possible on the scope of the transition question.5
When the focus is on expectations, the transition question arises in any
setting in which norms regarding the timing of changes to legal entitlements
may have an effect on pre-change expectations and, hence, conduct. These
settings include not only changes to positive law, but also judicial
reinterpretation of the law, administrative rule making, and even
announcements of administrative policy, such as, for example, the Federal
Reserve Chair’s pronouncements on the health of the economy.6 In each,
governmental action produces a change to legal entitlements (or to
LEGAL ISSUES 161, 163–68 (2003) [hereinafter Kaplow, Transition Policy].
3. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal
Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 216 n.5 (2003) [hereinafter Logue, Legal
Transitions].
4. See, e.g., Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 551 (“The economic
analysis presented thus far generally favors a transition policy of nominally prospective
implementation of changes in government policy with no transitional relief.”); SHAVIRO,
supra note 1, at 229 (generally proposing no transition relief for “policy change retroactive
taxes”—i.e., for transitions where the new steady-state rule has different content that the
prior one).
5. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1657, 1658 (1999) [hereinafter Levmore, Changes].
6. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 517 (citing, among others,
“changes in monetary and fiscal policy” as instances of legal transitions).
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expectations regarding legal entitlements), and in each, expectations about
the effective date of any such future change have an impact on the prechange conduct of affected parties. Thus, one commentator has defined the
term legal transition as the resolution of any uncertainty regarding future
legal rules to the extent that the uncertainty affects decisions made
currently.7 Another has defined it as any change to legal entitlements.8
In this Article, I argue that the conceptual apparatus that supports
the approach just described is flawed, and that the transitions analysis that
rests on it is in many ways unpersuasive as a consequence.9 Because the
literature begins by assimilating all manner of changes to entitlements to a
single model of quasi-factual change, it elides distinctions that are needed
to explain background assumptions that the literature tacitly makes but
cannot support. These assumptions are both necessary for, but inexplicable
within, a model that understands legal transitions as closely akin to marketbased or natural change. If the assumptions are abandoned, the market
model of legal change on which so much of the transition analysis rests
collapses. If the assumptions are retained, the distinctions among the
various types of legal change that the recent literature tends to dismiss need
to be retained, and if these are retained, many of the tenets of the older view
discarded under the newer view regain their vitality.
As important as what I argue below is what I do not argue. I do not
claim that the “new view” transitions literature has advanced wildly
implausible normative or empirical claims, or that there is nothing to be
gained from the anticipations-oriented approach. Nor, conversely, do I
suggest that proponents of the “old,” reliance-based view identified the
correct set of transition norms. Rather, the claims here are that the current
literature is analytically deficient, to some extent schizophrenic, and largely
unable to generate defensible propositions about transition norms that are
different from those of, and not better understood within, the “old view” of
legal transitions that it rejects. The analytical deficiencies include a failure
to develop consistent definitions of such key concepts as “transition,” “legal
transition,” and “transition norm”; the schizophrenia consists in the reliance
of “new view” theorists on some of the same transition practices that they
7. Id. at 512.
8. See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 25–26.
9. Others have criticized the recent transitions literature as unhelpful, though
generally on different grounds. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Legislative Compromise and Tax
Transition Policy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2007). In a similar vein, Mark Ramseyer and
Minoru Nakazato have opposed the now dominant view that transition relief is typically a
bad idea by arguing that a requirement of grandfather relief when the law changes enables
Congress to insulate itself from lobbying groups interested in retaining prior, presumably
worse, law. See Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection
Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REV. 1155 (1989).
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criticize; and the literature’s inability to generate novel and defensible
claims is evidenced by its failures to account for the differing transition
defaults operative in the adjudicative and legislative arenas, and to
demonstrate that a reliance-based view is unable to reach correct results on
the question of the proper default norms for changes to positive law and for
judicial decisions that adopt new rules.
Part II sets out a brief history of the of the transitions literature and
describes the currently dominant “new view” approach to legal transitions.
Part III examines the assumptions on which the new view relies and
reformulates that view in a way that makes explicit its conceptual
underpinnings; the principal purpose of this exercise is neither to defend
nor to criticize the new view, but instead to offer an account that adequately
operationalizes it. Part IV offers a criticism of the new view account of
legal change as so reformulated, and Part V extends the criticism to the
arguments that new view scholars have made against reliance as a basis for
certain forms of transition relief.
II.
A.

LEGAL TRANSITIONS

In General

The legal transitions literature asks the question: What norm or
norms should govern the relationship between the time at which a change in
law is announced and the time at which the change becomes effective?
Subsidiary questions are whether and what kind of relief or penalties should
apply to individuals who are affected by the change because of pre-change
decisions they made in reliance on the old rule. Should individuals
adversely affected receive transition relief in the form of grandfathering,
phased implementation or some other method, or should they simply absorb
the costs that result from unanticipated legal change? Similarly, should the
unintended beneficiaries of legal change have some or all of the benefits
taxed away?10
The literature’s paradigmatic example is the repeal of the exclusion
10. For each of these questions, the issue is what to do about the consequences of the
transition that result from its having been unanticipated, not about the gains or losses that
different individuals experience as a result of the new legal rule on a steady-state basis.
Thus, the fact that labor may be less favorably taxed under a consumption tax than under an
income tax does not by itself create a transition issue on the shift from an income tax to a
consumption tax. However, to the extent that individuals, prior to the transition, allocated
more of their resources to the future production of labor income on the assumption that the
income tax would continue indefinitely, a transition issue does arise on the shift to a
consumption tax. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 516.
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from gross income of interest earned on certain municipal bonds.11 If
Congress repealed the exclusion tomorrow with an immediate effective
date, certain parties would be adversely affected by their failure to
anticipate the repeal at the time they made decisions that are affected by it.
An individual who purchased a thirty-year tax-exempt bond last year would
suffer a substantial transition loss, because virtually all of the benefit of the
exclusion would be lost.12 Similarly, states and municipalities would suffer
transition losses to the extent they had committed resources to future
projects on the assumption that they would be able to finance those projects
with future borrowing at a low interest rate. Analogously, holders of
taxable debt would enjoy an unanticipated windfall because the value of the
debt would rise. Had any of these parties been aware of the impending
repeal at the time they were making the relevant investment decisions, they
likely would have acted differently.
If Congress thought issuers or holders of municipal bonds should
be protected from the losses that arise on unanticipated repeal, then
Congress could adopt an effective date of the new rule far into the future,
make some sort of relief available for pre-repeal investors, or both. For
example, the repeal could be implemented in steps (such as by removing
the exclusion for a fraction of the interest initially, with greater fractions
removed in subsequent years), or it could be applied only to bonds issued
after the enactment date.13 Conversely, if one thought that investors’ and
issuers’ anticipation of new law would produce better outcomes overall
than does their reliance on the availability of relief, one might favor
immediate or even explicitly retroactive application of a repeal with little or
no transition relief.
Prior to Michael Graetz’s influential work on tax transitions, what
has since become known as the “old view” of legal transitions held sway.14
Under the old view, the norm that changes to positive law should take effect

11. I.R.C. § 103 (2010). Graetz made this example the focus of his analysis, and
subsequent authors have done so as well. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1,
passim; Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 515–16; Saul Levmore, The Case for
Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 266 n.3 (1993) [hereinafter Levmore,
Retroactive Taxation] (“The tax-exempt bond example is a favorite of the legal transition
literature.”); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits
of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1133 [hereinafter Logue, Tax
Transitions] (“The classic illustration of these concepts involves the repeal of the exemption
for interest on state and local bonds.”); SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 5–8.
12. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 54–57, for a detailed discussion of
the consequences of such an un-grandfathered repeal.
13. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 52–53, for a discussion of possible
effective dates.
14. SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 2–3.
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no earlier than on the date of enactment, or in certain cases the date of
public announcement,15 typically rested either on the conventional idea that
fairness demanded that individuals subject to the law be able to know what
it is before they act, or on the belief that one’s inability to rely on the law at
the time one made decisions affected by it created substantial
inefficiencies.16 Further, it was widely accepted that transition relief was
appropriate for certain types of legal change, such as the repeal of a tax
preference or, more generally, of any legal rule that on enactment
represented an invitation to act in a certain way. By contrast, the norm of
retroactivity for judicial decisions was thought to rest on the basis that
adjudication clarifies what the law already is; as a consequence, no unfair
change to the rules arises when a new interpretation is announced.17
Moreover, at least the scope of uncertainty in any particular statute that
might be resolved by subsequent decisional law was limited, so that the
adverse incentive effects from the possibility of retroactively applied
judicial “new rules” were minimal.
Graetz’s 1977 article marked a turning point in the scholarly
approach. He argued that in the tax context, neither fairness nor efficiency
considerations supported the widespread use of delayed effective dates or
transition relief when the tax law changed.18 Broadly stated, Graetz
adopted a two-pronged attack to the transition relief norm. First, he noted
that almost any legal transition is likely to have ramifications for many
parties beyond the typical beneficiaries of relief.19 For example, the rules
permitting accelerated depreciation for physical capital affect not only
purchasers of favorably treated capital but also manufacturers of it, who are
likely to increase production in response to stimulated demand. A repeal of
the accelerated depreciation rules might be grandfathered for pre-repeal
purchasers, but no existing norm would suggest that manufacturers who,
prior to repeal, had invested in plant and equipment to construct favorably
treated capital also would enjoy transition relief.
15. Not uncommonly, changes to positive law or to “legislative” rules are nominally
retroactive to the date of announcement in the Congressional Record or the Federal Register.
See, for example, Edwin S. Cohen, The Administration’s Interim Program of Tax Reform
and Tax Relief, 47 TAXES 325 (1969), for a discussion of an example of this type of
retroactivity. In the typical case, such changes address perceived failures of the pre-change
regime to give effect to the intent of Congress or the relevant agency on the legal question in
issue. Such changes, though legislative in form, are more akin to interpretive clarifications
of prior law than to a genuine shift in policy.
16. See, e.g., Martin S. Feldstein, On the Theory of Tax Reform, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 77,
93–94 (1976).
17. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 49–50, 73–79; Kaplow, Economic
Analysis, supra note 1, at 515.
18. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 63–87.
19. Id. at 56–57.
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Second, Graetz argued that even on its own terms a norm of
extensive transition relief could not be justified according to any of the
standard measures ordinarily used to evaluate tax rules, including
efficiency, reliance, horizontal equity, vertical equity, and social contract
theories of government.20 For example, the notion that a norm of transition
relief avoided inefficient precautionary behavior by investors who would
not take offered tax preferences at face value made unwarranted empirical
assumptions about the costs of requiring individuals rather than the
government to bear transition losses. Graetz argued that in light of both the
generally accepted view that markets are efficient and the fact that legal
changes are probabilistic events that affect the value of investments just as
other unknowns do, it was more reasonable to assume that transition costs
would be minimized if investors bore transition risk and spread it through
markets than if the government bore the risk and spread it to the populace
generally.21 Similarly, the idea that reliance interests justified or required
strong norms of non-retroactivity was largely question-begging. What
constitutes reasonable reliance is itself a question that needs to be settled on
the basis of other principles, since expectations are not free-floating but rest
on actual practices.22 Because none of the standard fairness arguments
supported a strong non-retroactivity norm, the case seemed weak on
reliance grounds as well.23
Underlying these two arguments was Graetz’s more basic and farreaching insight that the distinction between retroactivity and prospectivity
on which so much of the older literature relied was in many ways arbitrary.
Once one recognized that transition gains and losses arise because rules that
take effect in the future have an effect on the consequences of past conduct,
20. Id. at 63–87.
21. In particular, actors would accept or decline the “invitation” based in part on their
assessments of the likelihood that preference would be repealed at a time or in a way that
would adversely affect their investment. Whether and when such a repeal would occur often
would be no more predictable by the enacting legislature than by those to whom it applied.
Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 64–66.
22. For an extension of the argument, see Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at
170.
23. Graetz’s criticisms of the reliance theory included the following: (1) the extent of
reliance depends on individual assessments of the probability of legal change that can vary
from person to person and that in the end provide no stable benchmark for assessing whether
the reliance is reasonable; (2) the reasonableness of reliance depends on developments that
change the calculation of whether reliance is reasonable; (3) apparently formal distinctions
(such as whether the possibility of future repeal is made express or not) in the framing of
legislation can affect the reasonableness of reliance; (4) relief tends to protect only a subset
of those who relied on the old law; and (5) individual reliance on the possibility that a
provision will be enacted does not seem different from reliance on a provision that is enacted
and then quickly repealed, yet reliance in the former case does not entitle individuals to
relief when the provision is not enacted. Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 74–78.
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the notion that legal change that was expressly directed at past conduct (socalled nominal retroactivity) differed categorically from legal change that
was only “forward looking” seemed mistaken. If a forward-looking,
ungrandfathered repeal of the municipal bond interest exclusion has nearly
as great an effect on a purchaser who bought a 30-year municipal bond in
the year before repeal as would an expressly retroactive repeal, the only
difference between the two types of transition would seem to be in degree.
The victim of nominally retroactive repeal suffers a loss of all 30 years of
exclusion of interest on the bond, while the victim of the nominally
prospective repeal loses just 29 years – a difference of but three percent.
Graetz observed that it is hard to see why this difference ought to matter all
that much in analyzing the effective dates of new rules.24 As a
consequence, in thinking about possible transition rules, there was no
reason in principle why new rules might not take effect immediately, and
even in some cases retroactively, even if the rules were “legislative” rather
than judicial, or articulations of “policy” rather than mere interpretations.
Stated otherwise, if any change other than one that occurs so far in the
future that all pre-change reliance interests are protected raises a
retroactivity concern, it would appear that we are already committed to
retroactivity in legal change even when the new rule is prospective only.
Therefore, we should not be especially solicitous of parties who bear
transition costs because the law changes.
Subsequent commentary has generally carried forward Graetz’s
observations as a basis on which to make the case against a norm of
Equally significantly, scholars have
extensive transition relief.25
appropriated Graetz’s analogy of legal transitions to other market-based
changes as a basis upon which to expand the analysis to all forms of legal
change. For example, Louis Kaplow describes a legal transition as any
unanticipated change in the expected value of legal entitlements that results
from government action.26 Under this definition, legal transitions include
not only changes to positive law, but also judicial and administrative

24. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 49–50.
25. See Logue, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 216–20 (reviewing the new view
approach to legal transitions).
26. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 517. The “government action”
qualification is arguably not explicit, though Kaplow discusses it at various points in the
exposition. See, e.g., id. at 517–18 (discussing changes in “government policy”). Further, if
the qualification is not assumed, it becomes impossible to distinguish legal transitions from
other kinds of transitions or events, such as those brought about by private actors. For a
criticism of the definition as overbroad to the point of including virtually all activity that
takes place or has consequences over time, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Development and
the Problem of Systemic Transition, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 261, 263–65 (2003). See
also discussion infra Part III.A.
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decisions, executive actions, and even statements of policy, as long as, in
each case, they were not fully anticipated before they became effective.27
Further, because the definition includes resolution of any uncertainty (or the
creation of any uncertainty) with respect to the future value of a present
entitlement, a transition issue arises for Kaplow even if no actual change to
a rule or policy has taken place.28 Thus, the filing of a lawsuit on the basis
of a novel legal theory would raise a transition issue, even if the lawsuit
ultimately were found non-meritorious (a second transition issue).
Other scholars have adopted similar approaches. Dan Shaviro
poses the transition question as arising under essentially the same
circumstances as Kaplow does.29 Kyle Logue characterizes a legal
transition as occurring whenever there is an unexpected change to legal
entitlements.30 Thus, as under Kaplow’s view, legal transitions arise both
when the positive law changes and when a new interpretation of existing
law comes into effect. Logue also argues that legal transitions arise on
scientific discoveries, if the discovery has the effect of altering legal
entitlements. As an example, the discovery that asbestos causes cancer was
a form of legal transition because it affected the legal entitlements of
(among others) asbestos manufacturers, even though it did not involve “a
change in the substantive liability rule.”31
The motivation for this expansive interpretation of the concept of a
legal transition derives from the consequentialist orientation of the new
view. When expectations are the concern, the type of change to legal
entitlements becomes largely immaterial, because the prospect of any type
of change affects expectations. Consequently, the distinctions among types
of legal change become matters of degree, not of kind:32 Changes to
positive law are likely to be more sweeping than changes to decisional law,
and actors are less likely to be able to anticipate their magnitude and
direction.33 Conversely, positive law changes tend to be forward-looking
(in form), whereas judicially created legal transitions have nominally

27. The requirement of unexpectedness also implies that many transitions in the
conventional sense do not raise transition issues. For example, a change to tax rates
scheduled to take effect in one year does not raise a transition issue.
28. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 517; see also Kaplow, Transition
Policy, supra note 2, at 165 n.5.
29. See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 25–26.
30. See Logue, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 211–12.
31. Id. at 250.
32. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 516; see also Logue, Legal
Transitions, supra note 3, at 239–42.
33. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 63–65 (noting that the law may
change in unpredictable ways as tastes and other conditions change).
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retroactive effect.34 These differences will have varying effects on the
extent to which actors likely to be affected by the prospect of change will
insure against it, but that is all. Apart from these differences, the various
modes of legal change seem to differ only in formal or otherwise inessential
particulars. As Kaplow puts the point, “[t]o private parties, gains are gains,
losses are losses, and taxation and compensation of gains and losses have
the same cost or benefit regardless of the original source of the effects
being mitigated.”35
B.

The Case for Immediately Effective, Uncompensated Transitions

On the basis of the preceding account of legal transitions, Kaplow
offered a powerful and influential argument for enactment-date
effectiveness of most legal change, and against almost all forms of
transition relief. The argument rests on two fundamental similarities shared
by all legal transitions: that they raise the question of absorbing the costs of
uncertainty, and that they appear to be no different in principle from
ordinary market risks that investors must bear ex ante.36 Because it is easy
to show under a wide range of assumptions that the most efficient method
for absorbing market risk is private ordering, Kaplow argued that from an
efficiency perspective these features of legal transitions made the case
against delayed effect and strong forms of transition relief practically
overwhelming.37 He also argued that even enactment-date effectiveness
should give way to nominal retroactivity in certain cases, such as where the
prior regime turned out to have been undesirable during the period it was in
effect.38
The efficiency argument for the superiority of private ordering over
government relief in the market risk context is straightforward. Consider
Kaplow’s example of the prospective builder or owner of a house on a
flood plain.39 An individual who must bear the costs of a flood in the first
instance can be expected to make the efficient decision about whether and
how to bear them—by absorbing the loss if the individual builds or owns
and the flood occurs, by purchasing insurance (or self-insuring), or by
34. SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 112.
35. Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 177.
36. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 515–19. Following Kaplow, I
use the term “market risk” to include “all risks—including the risk of natural events such as
floods—not caused by uncertainty concerning future government policy.” Id. at 533 n.62.
37. See id. at 541–42.
38. Whether nominal prospectivity constitutes transition relief is a point of contention.
See infra Part IV.
39. See Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 177–79.
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building or owning elsewhere. By contrast, builders and owners who can
rely on a general policy of government relief from losses due to floods can
be expected to over-invest in houses on flood plains because they do not
need to bear the cost of a flood if it occurs. In effect, government insurance
creates an externality by providing a costless put option for those who
invest on land in flood plains.40 Further, privately arranged risk-shifting
and risk-spreading are almost certain to be superior to government-provided
relief because the latter does not distinguish among the different levels of
risk tolerance of different private actors.
Turning to legal transitions, it would appear that transition risk
should be borne in the first instance by private actors because the possibility
of a legal transition, like that of a flood, is a foreseeable probabilistic event
that has an effect on the market value of investments.41 There are two
aspects to the efficiency gain of requiring investors to bear transition losses.
First, private insurance remains more efficient than government relief, for
the same reasons that it is superior in the case of market-based events.
Where investors must bear the costs of legal change in the first instance,
they will spread or shift risk so that it is optimally allocated between
themselves and others. Second, forcing private investors to bear the risk of
legal change will lead to beneficial pre-transition anticipation of future law,
as long as it is reasonable to suppose that the law is improving. While this
assumption has been aptly described as “heroic,”42 it is at least reasonable
as a working assumption or a first approximation. Thus, if we think that
strict product liability in tort provides a better regime than negligence for
risk-bearing and -spreading, a transition norm that does not permit
manufacturers to rely on transition relief will encourage them to act as
though strict liability applied avant la lettre. Indeed, the prospect of
retroactive application of such a regime is likely to have still greater
beneficial effect. Such pre-transition changes in conduct produce welfare
gains apart from the savings that private insurance provides over transition
relief.43

40. One might object that forcing such individuals to bear these costs unfairly
penalizes those who may lack the means to purchase insurance or to rebuild, possibly
through no fault of their own. The usual response is that such hardships are due to preexisting distributive inequities that should be dealt with in other ways, such as through taxand-transfer programs that are not keyed to specific losses. Programs of this nature do not
effect distributive objectives by means of inefficient subsidies. See id.
41. Graetz himself raised this point, but it has been more fully developed in the later
literature. See Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 65–66.
42. Levmore, Changes, supra note 5, at 1662.
43. See Logue, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 217 n.10 for authorities.
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'ominal Retroactivity

More recently, Shaviro has offered an in-depth analysis of tax
transitions and retroactive relief in his book, When Rules Change.44
Shaviro’s work is marked by subtlety, analytical rigor, and generality in its
relaxation of the assumptions that law is generally improving and that
legislators act benevolently.45 However, although the book deepens and
expands upon the analyses that Graetz, Kaplow and other new view
theorists have developed, it does not abandon their conceptual
underpinnings.46 Rather Shaviro adopts the welfarist orientation of the new
view47 as well as the new view’s skepticism regarding the significance of
popular distinctions, such as that between nominally retroactive and
nominally prospective legal change.48
Shaviro’s discussion of the anti-nominal retroactivity (ANR) norm
in the tax context offers a particularly clear explication of the grounds for
this skepticism.49 The ANR norm is simply the prevailing idea that tax
legislation ought not apply with expressly retroactive effect. Shaviro’s
discussion purports to show that the ANR norm does not rest on any
categorical distinction between nominally retroactive and nominally
prospective transition rules, but instead “is strongly rooted in popular
sentiment, legislative practice, and perhaps even the Constitution as the
courts are likely to interpret it.”50
Shaviro begins by acknowledging the appropriateness of the ANR
norm for what he calls “rules of the road,” or matters of pure convention.51
These are cases in which the problem that a legal rule solves is primarily
one of coordinating conduct among persons, rather than optimally
conforming their conduct to an externally-given constraint. It does not
much matter whether everyone drives on the left or the right; what matters
is that everyone drives on the same side. Similarly, it does not matter

44. SHAVIRO, supra note 1.
45. See id. at 64–91.
46. As an example of refinement, Shaviro disaggregates the idea of a transition tax (or
subsidy) from that of transition risk. The former is the component of a transition reflecting
an expected overall reduction (increase) in returns from an anticipated rule change offered
without transition relief, while the latter is simply the effect that uncertainty about the future
has on asset values, even though on an ex ante basis the expected value of an asset subject to
a future rule change remains constant. See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 27–32.
47. “This book’s framework is utilitarianism.” Id. at 4.
48. See id. at 104.
49. See id. at 104–10.
50. Id. at 104. Shaviro’s analysis thus may be thought of as developing observations
first made by Graetz and later developed by Kaplow and others on this point.
51. Id. at 104–05.
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whether the default taxable year begins January 1 or July 1; what matters is
that the default applies to everyone in a given class.
It might seem that to acknowledge a set of cases in which the ANR
norm would be inappropriate concedes the basic point, for if the ANR norm
were entirely arbitrary, then it should have no proper application to any
category of legal transitions other than by chance. But Shaviro’s point
seems to be simply that rules of the road should not have retroactive effect
at all, be it through nominal retroactivity or through nominal prospectivity
that does not provide relief. Accordingly, when a rule of the road is
adopted or altered, there is no particular reason either for the new rule to
apply with nominally retroactive effect, or for transition relief not to be
provided to those who relied on the old rule.52 An arbitrary rule whose
content is that it functions as a coordinating device typically provides no
particular clue to individuals subject to it that they should anticipate its
change.
More importantly, no efficiency gain from eliminating
retroactivity is likely to arise by dispensing with the ANR norm or
transition relief for such cases, because the gains derive from the
coordination of parties with each other, not from conforming the conduct of
the parties to an independent state of affairs to which the rule responds.
Shaviro contrasts rules of the road with tax rules whose
significance consists at least in part in their furtherance of some
independent policy.53 Despite the fact that the ANR norm extends to most
such rules, the difference in real terms between express retroactivity and
express prospectivity is, in his view, essentially arbitrary for the nowfamiliar reasons first identified by Graetz and developed by Kaplow.54 As
Shaviro puts it, neither the apparent effect nor the apparent command of the
ANR norm bars retroactive application of new legal rules. The apparent
effect of the norm is to cause each period’s events to be taxed under the
rules in force at the time rather than at a later time; its apparent demand is
that a prior period’s events not be revisited by applying a later period’s
rules to them.
Shaviro notes two objections to the norm. The first is that the tax
law often takes account of economic events many years after they occur.55
A simple example is the taxation of accrued capital gain or loss on an asset

52. Although Shaviro does not expressly state that new rules of the road should be
accompanied by transition relief, he elsewhere argues for transition relief for “accounting
rule changes”—that is, changes that do not involve an alteration of legal entitlements on a
steady-state basis. Id. at 53–54 (explaining accounting rule changes), 102–03 (arguing for
transition relief for such changes). Rules of the road would seem to fall into this category.
53. Id. at 105–07.
54. Id.; see supra Part II.B.
55. SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 106.
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in the year of disposition of the asset rather than in the years in which, and
at the rates at which, the gains or losses economically accrued. The second
is that “completed” transactions from prior years may have been undertaken
because of future tax benefits that could be repealed on a nominally
prospective basis, before the taxpayer has a chance to reap the benefits of
the pre-repeal decision.56 This is the example of a prospective and ungrandfathered repeal of the interest exclusion on municipal bonds. Shaviro
argues that because the tax rules under such subsequent regimes have an
effect on the tax consequences of transactions completed in prior periods,
“mere accounting considerations govern the definition of nominal
retroactivity.”57 That is, nominal retroactivity differs from nominal
prospectivity only in arbitrary accounting details, because both apply to
alter the consequences of past conduct. Ultimately, Shaviro concludes that
“[n]ominal retroactivity is inherently a formal, rather than a substantive,
economic category.”58
Shaviro’s view can perhaps be made clearer upon consideration of
the argument that is sometimes made that nominally retroactive statutes
differ from prospective ones in that the former apply to completed conduct
and in this regard cannot function as guides to conduct,59 whereas
nominally prospective changes can so function. Consider the significance
of this distinction with regard to the consequences of a pre-transition act.
As previously discussed, if B purchased tax-exempt bonds prior to the
repeal of the interest exclusion, the fact that the new rule is prospective only
does not mean that it does not apply to consequences of the pre-transition
conduct, just as a nominally retroactive rule would. There appear to be
only two differences. First, the nominally retroactive statute applies to
conduct, not just to its consequences, and second, its extent will be greater
because it will apply to all the consequences of pre-enactment conduct
(back to the effective date of the new rule); the nominally prospective
enactment applies only to current and future consequences. The second
point is conceded by all, but if the issue is that there is a categorical
distinction between nominal and merely “effective” retroactivity, the
question of degree does not matter. The first point similarly loses its
significance if one assumes that the purpose of the conduct—for example,
the purchase of tax-exempt bonds—is to realize the consequences. Where
the only concern is with the value yielded by the investment, there appears
to be no reason to place independent significance on preserving the rules

56.
57.
58.
59.
(1977).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 107.
One example is Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373
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applicable to the conduct itself.60 Likewise, if a nominally retroactive
enactment reaches back into the past, it appears that a nominally
prospective enactment also reaches back and does so in the same way: the
nominally prospective enactment reaches back into the past as to its
consequences, which is what actually matters about that conduct subject to
the enactment.
III.

THE APPARATUS OF RECENT TRANSITIONS ANALYSIS

Based on the preceding discussion, one might summarize the main
points of the new view as follows. Legal change is just like any other
random event that individuals need to take into account in arranging their
affairs. As a consequence, all unexpected changes to legal entitlements
raise the same basic issue, which is that parties who made investments on
the assumption that prior entitlement rules would continue to hold suffer
gains or losses because the assumption was false.
Because this
characteristic of legal change is not meaningfully different from market
change, and because the optimally efficient rule for managing market risks
is private ordering, or self-help, private ordering should apply to managing
legal transition risk as well. Further, under the assumption that law is
generally positive in direction, a norm of self-help encourages efficient
anticipatory modifications to behavior that are absent under a norm of
government relief. If it is a bad idea to provide a tax exclusion for interest
on municipal bonds, then investors facing the possibility of repeal of the
exclusion without transition relief will have a greater incentive not to invest
in the bonds solely for tax reasons than will investors expecting transition
relief on any subsequent repeal. The incentive will be greater still if the
prospect of a nominally retroactive repeal is in play. Conversely, while
transition relief may confer benefits such as providing welfare-enhancing
redistribution, these benefits can be more efficiently provided through other
mechanisms, such as transfer payments or progressive taxation. Finally,
although problems of public choice raise additional concerns, it is not at all
clear that they point in favor of a norm of transition relief; in fact they may
suggest that absence of relief is closer to the optimal norm.61
This part focuses more closely on the distinctions that the recent
transitions literature has drawn in reaching these conclusions. The objects
are, first, to formulate more precisely the conceptual framework that is
implicit in the new view and, second, to draw out some of the implications
of the view that may not have been recognized by its proponents.
60. Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 165.
61. SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 64–91.
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Entitlement Rules and Transition Rules

The new view understands legal transitions as occurring whenever
there is a change to legal entitlements. Implicit in the account is a
distinction between legal entitlements and rules that specify when distinct
entitlements hold. Thus, the rule that interest earned on municipal bonds is
excluded from gross income specifies an entitlement, as does its opposite.
Similarly, a rule that, for example, loans for medical school will be forgiven
for doctors working in low-pay practices constitutes an entitlement rule, as
does the rule that such loans must be repaid according to their nominal
terms. If the bond interest exclusion or the favorable rule on medical
school loans were repealed, a rule likely would apply that specifies when
the respective entitlement rules hold. That specification could be express,
or it could be implicit through the operation of some default rule, such as
one stating that changes to positive law are understood to take effect on the
date of enactment in the absence of explicit legislation to the contrary.
Whether express or tacit, such a rule is a transition rule.62 Stated more
generally, transition rules are meta-rules that specify the temporal
relationship between or among distinct entitlement rules.63
Under this model, one could reformulate a repeal of the bond
interest exclusion taking effect one year after enactment as follows:
Entitlement Rule 1: Interest on municipal bonds is excluded from
gross income.
Entitlement Rule 2: Interest on municipal bonds is not excluded
from gross income.
Transition Rule: Entitlement Rule 1 shall be effective until one
year from the date hereof, and Entitlement Rule 2 shall be effective for all

62. Stephen Munzer introduced a similar distinction in an early article, though it is not
precisely the same as that here. See Munzer, supra note 59, at 388 (“The legal status of an
act depends not on something inherent to that act, but on the relation the act has to the law or
laws governing its status.”). The entitlement-transition rule distinction also is arguably
implicit in Eric Chason’s treatment of legal transitions. See Eric Chason, The Economic
Ambiguity (and Possible Irrelevance) of Tax Transition Rules, 22 VA. TAX REV. 615, 620
(2003) (defining transition rules in temporal terms and characterizing the definitions as
formal).
63. Kaplow analyzes the question in terms of changes to the scheduled legal landscape
rather than to future entitlement rules, a formulation broad enough to capture situations in
which future law features planned changes to entitlement rules. Kaplow, Transition Policy,
supra note 2, at 165 n.5. I dispense with a consideration of known future variation in law,
because an evaluation of it would require introduction of considerable complexity without
altering the basic argument. The complexity results from having to distinguish between
entitlements that change where, by hypothesis, the change does not raise a transition issue,
from entitlement changes that do.
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dates on or after one year from the date hereof.
Framed in terms of the distinction between entitlement rules and
transition rules, the transition question is a third-order meta-question about
a second-order meta-rule: What (third-order) policy or norm should govern
the (second-order) transition rules that determine when certain (first-order)
entitlement rules apply?64 A number of answers, of course, are possible.
One is that the date the new rule is announced (the “announcement date”)
and the date it becomes effective (the “effective date”) should be the same;
another is that the announcement date should precede the effective date by
some interval (delayed effective date); a third would be the opposite: that
the effective date should precede the announcement date by some amount
of time (nominal retroactivity). Other possibilities include having distinct
transition rules for distinct groups (i.e., what is commonly termed
“transition relief”): delayed effective dates to the extent that the investor
holds investments that were subject to the old rule on the announcement
date (grandfathering), and, perhaps, announcement date effectiveness for all
others.
B.

Implications of the Entitlement Rule-Transition Rule Dichotomy

Several observations about the method of conceptualizing legal
transitions as changes to entitlement rules are in order. For the most part,
these observations do not call into question the new view approach to legal
transitions, but they do illustrate the ways in which the new view literature
has elided important questions that it has raised. They also make possible a
more rigorous analysis of the approach the new view has developed.
1.

Transitions vs. Transition Rules

The first observation is that the existence of a legal transition does
not imply the existence of a transition rule. This conclusion follows from
the definition of a transition rule as the rule specifying the time at which
two distinct entitlement rules apply to a type of arrangement.65 It is
64. The meta-character of the transition question has been noted in the literature. See,
e.g., id. at 169 (“[T]he [subject of transition] involves a sort of meta-problem.”). The
literature also has addressed the still higher-order question of what the appropriate transition
to the appropriate transition policy should be. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note
1, at 557–60; Kirk J. Stark, The Elusive Transition to a Tax Transition Policy, 13 AM. J. TAX
POL. 145 (1996).
65. Again, this definition was needed in order to support a conception of legal
transitions capacious enough to include all alterations to legal entitlements, no matter their
provenance, as the new view literature requires, while excluding changes to the value of
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logically possible for there to be no rule, express or tacit, that specifies
when two inconsistent entitlement rules apply. In such a case, the new
entitlement simply supplants the old one and applies at all times on the
separate basis that the actions of currently empowered legal actors
supersede the actions of legal actors no longer in power.66 While the
absence of a transition rule does not ordinarily obtain in practice, it is
important to keep in mind the analytical distinction so that it is possible to
formulate the transitions problem accurately, as conceived by the new
view—after all, it might be desirable in some circumstances to do away
with transition rules entirely. (Recall that it was the dissatisfaction with the
conventional understanding of legal transitions as changes to positive law
that gave rise to the need for a definition that is neutral with regard to the
time and manner of any changes to legal entitlements.) One example that
illustrates the idea of a transition without a transition rule is the analogous
case of a change to scientific understanding—the shift, perhaps, from the
Ptolemaic to the Copernican view of the solar system. When the
Copernican view supplanted the Ptolemaic, there was of course no notion
that the Ptolemaic had been correct at some time in the past; rather the
thought was that the Copernican view had always been correct; it merely
had not been recognized as such. The notion that a transition rule would
apply in such a circumstance is meaningless.
A second, more familiar, example is that of ordinary judicial
interpretation of positive law. If a court announces a new interpretation of a
statute, the new interpretation may purport to explicate the true meaning of
the statute—at least under a conventional view of adjudication, sometimes
referred to as the declaratory theory.67 Because the court’s interpretation
states the meaning at the time of the conduct to which it applies, the
interpretation typically applies with at least some retroactive force. Of
course it does not literally apply with full retroactivity, but the reasons
typically are grounded in separate policy considerations such as finality, not
in the notion that the court’s interpretation says what the law means now
investments that result from events that fall short of actual rule changes. A more
conventional understanding of legal transitions would view them as changes to positive law
(and perhaps “legislative regulations”) and therefore could bundle together what I have
called the entitlement rule and the transition rule in the definition of legal transition.
66. One might counter that the rule obtained by the later-enacted or -adopted rule,
rather than the earlier, constitutes a transition rule, but this rule simply specifies the source
of law, not the determination of when law that emanates from that source applies. I thank
Scott Shapiro for alerting me to this issue.
67. See Munzer, supra note 59, at 374 (“Under [the declaratory theory], if a court
‘overrules’ an earlier decision, it does no more than declare what the law has always been
and apply it to the case at hand.”). There are serious difficulties with the declaratory theory,
but the notion that judicial interpretation offers a pronouncement of what the statute or rule
was at the time of conduct in question need not rely on the declaratory theory.
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but not at other times.68
2.

Relevant Anticipations

The second observation about the new view’s way of formulating
the concept of a legal transition is that if no transition rule were the norm,
the relevant anticipation (setting aside the fact that investors are mortal)
would not be of the next legal change, but of the ultimate change to the
“best” legal regime, or at least to the final one. The reason is that in the
absence of a transition rule, the full retroactivity of every legal rule would
nullify the prophylactic measures that investors would take with respect to
all intermediate legal changes. This follows, again, from the distinction
between entitlement rules and transition rules that is presupposed in the
new legal transitions literature. If only entitlement rules change when legal
change occurs, then no temporal limitation on the new entitlement rule
applies; the rule has full retroactive effect and the detriments and/or
windfalls from the new regime apply to all time periods, past and future.
For example, suppose it turns out that the “best” tax regime is some form of
consumption tax, and it is assumed that legal change is positive in direction.
If no transition rules operated in legal change, then investors who are farsighted enough to recognize the ultimate direction of the law should not
react to an intermediate repeal, under the current income tax, of the
preference on municipal bonds by investing in other assets until the market
price of muni bonds drops to reflect the anticipated repeal, even though
investors will be subject to tax on all interest they have ever received on
such bonds when that repeal occurs. Although the preference repeal would
cause investors to pay tax on the preference and indeed with full
retroactivity, that change would itself be nullified when the final shift to a
consumption tax occurs, again with full retroactivity.
3.

Implied vs. Express Transition Rules

Third, a transition rule need not be express to be in effect.
Returning to the municipal bond interest example, repeal of the exclusion
for all interest accrued from the date of enactment forward would constitute
adoption of a new entitlement rule and a transition rule, whether the
effective date were spelled out in the statute or simply assumed under a
default rule. The repeal would provide both a new rule about bond interest
(that it is included in gross income) and a rule about the extent to which the
68. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (identifying finality concerns
that support statutes of limitations).

140

COLUMBIA JOUR'AL OF TAX LAW

[Vol. 1:120

old rule continued to apply to bond interest (that it remained valid for preenactment dates).69 Thus, the legislative norm that in the absence of an
express transition rule or effective date, new legislation takes effect on the
date of enactment constitutes a transition rule, assuming that a legal
transition is defined as the literature has defined it.70 Similarly, the
Constitutional ban on ex post facto criminal legislation71 creates a
mandatory transition rule for federal criminal statutes, in the sense of a
limitation on retroactive application. Conversely, the default norm for
judicial decisions is that no transition rule operates (apart from a separately
provided statute of limitations and a separate rule for already decided
cases), so that the absence of an express transition rule gives rise to full
retroactivity for all cases not already settled or beyond the applicable
statutes of limitations.
4.

Scientific Developments Are Not Legal Transitions.

Finally, note that even the expansive definition of a legal transition
offered here does not appear to embrace factual or scientific developments
that have a bearing on legal entitlements, contrary to the claims of some
new view theorists such as Logue.72 To illustrate the idea that the category
of legal transitions includes such developments, Logue uses the example of
newly discovered scientific evidence demonstrating that a product causes a

69. Whether default norms operate in specified contexts to limit the effect of change
temporally is a separate issue that merely goes to expectations that have developed and the
reasons for them; it does not go to the nature of legal transitions themselves. For example,
many legal changes ordinarily have retroactive effect. The most common example is a new
judicial interpretation of any pre-existing legal rule or doctrine. See SHAVIRO, supra note 1,
at 112–15.
70. See, e.g., id. at 112 (“It has long been a truism that ‘statutes operate only
prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively.’” (quoting Rivers v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994))). Again, the notion that the absence of an
express transition rule implies that a default transition rule is in effect follows from the
demands of the welfarist conceptual apparatus. A more conventional understanding of the
concept of a legal transition would permit one to view a transition rule as in effect only when
the effective date departed from the legislative default. This understanding, however, would
be based on the notion that a change to positive law is a different kind of thing from a new
interpretation of existing law. If one is prepared to make that distinction, then one may
consistently go on to view the change from the pre- to the post-enactment regime as intrinsic
to a legal transition, and therefore to view transition rules as applying only when an
exception is made to the general rule of date-of-enactment effectiveness.
71. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
72. Logue, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 211; c.f. Kaplow, Economic Analysis,
supra note 1, at 524 (discussing a product discovered to be unsafe on the basis of new
scientific evidence).
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certain type of harm.73 In the example, he assumes that an underlying strict
liability regime is in place and does not change.74 He analyzes a court’s
decision to accept the new causation theory for the first time as a legal
transition because the decision changes legal entitlements and the change
was the result of a governmental action to accept the new theory.75
The difficulty with this analysis is that the change to legal
entitlements resulting from a scientific development appears to be no
different from the change that such a development brings to the market
value of an investment; only the governmental actor responsible for
enforcing it differs. Suppose A owns a copper mine and it is discovered
that copper is particularly useful in a new computer chip manufacturing
process. The value of A’s entitlement increases dramatically because the
price of copper has risen. But this value will be accorded to A only on the
assumption that the legal system will continue to protect A’s property rights
in the mine. The difference between this case and the products liability
case is only the operative legal regime—property rights in one, and tort in
the other. In each case, the legal regime continues to do what it always did,
which is to assign legal entitlements and obligations according to an
unchanged set of rules. Unless one is prepared to say that the discovery of
the new use for copper creates a new entitlement rule, it appears one cannot
say that the new theory of causation in tort does either.
IV.

CRITICISM

With a more precise definition in hand of the concept of a legal
transition as it is understood by scholars under the new view, it becomes
possible to evaluate the view more directly. In this part I examine two of its
aspects: first, the claim that legal transitions are closely akin to factual or
market changes, and second, the tacit assumption that legal transition norms
can be evaluated apart from certain questions of political legitimacy and
authority. The arguments made in this part give rise to a third set of
questions that I take up in Part V: whether the new view in fact has much
to say about legal transitions that has not already been said before. The
sequence of the discussion is intended to be progressive. The second
argument developed in this part builds on the first, while the analysis of
Part V follows naturally from the considerations discussed in this part.
Once it becomes clear that legal transitions are not closely akin to factual
changes, it becomes incumbent on new view theorists to offer a defense of
73. Logue, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 239–41.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 239–40.
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the new view that does not depend on the analogy. When that defense fails,
the doubt of the extent to which the new literature has made significant
contributions to our understanding of legal transitions becomes salient.
A.

Analogy of Legal Transitions to Factual Developments

I have previously noted that scholars in the legal transitions area
have relied on the analogy between legal and factual change to support a
norm of enactment date effectiveness. Kaplow offers perhaps the clearest
statement of the analogy:
[W]here the focus is on private actors and government
substantive policy is taken to be optimal, governmentcreated risk and risk due to market or natural forces, as well
as government mitigation of such risk, are almost precisely
analogous. To private parties, gains are gains, losses are
losses, and taxation and compensation of gains and losses
have the same cost or benefit regardless of the original
source of the effects being mitigated. Likewise, market
relief for risk—whether through explicit insurance
arrangements or implicitly, such as through diversified
financial ownership—is in principle equally effective
regardless the source of the risk.76
As Kaplow’s statement makes clear, the analogy is meant to
function as more than a casual observation about the parallels between legal
and market transition risk. Rather, it amounts to a restatement of his
“demonstration that uncertainty concerning government policy is
analytically equivalent to general market uncertainty.”77
The distinction between entitlement and liability rules developed in
76. Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 177. For other statements, see Michael
J. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1825 (1985) [hereinafter Graetz,
Retroactivity Revisited] (“The costs of uncertainty in the law do not seem necessarily
different in kind or in magnitude from the costs of uncertainty in markets . . . .”); see also
Logue, Legal Transitions, supra note 3, at 221 (noting the reasonableness of the market
analogy assuming investors are rational).
77. Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 520. See also Kaplow, Transition
Policy, supra note 2, at 179 (“Because government-created risk is analogous in relevant
respects to market and natural risks and because government mitigation of gains and losses
is inefficient with regard to the latter, it follows that it must be inefficient with regard to the
former.”); Chason, supra note 62, at 616–17 (describing the Graetz-Kaplow view as based
on the analogy between the risk of repeal and the risk of market-based or casualty losses).
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Part III provides useful purchase on the question of whether the analogy is
accurate or persuasive. As explained there, entitlement rules specify
underlying legal rights and obligations, and transition rules specify the
temporal conditions under which the former apply. This highly generic
definition of legal transitions follows from the requirement that all forms of
legal change or development be grouped together without regard to the
nature or authority of the decision-maker initiating the transition or to what
gives rise to the decision-maker’s decision. Although a conventional
understanding of legal change would not need to insist on abstracting
entitlements from meta-rules regarding their temporal application, that
course is unavailable under the new view because of the expansive concept
of transitions it adopts as a result of the focus on anticipations.
Once the distinction between entitlement rules and transition rules
is accepted, however, it becomes apparent that a legal change has a
different kind of effect from a factual or market-based development,
because factual and market changes do not reach back into the past (or, for
that matter, stretch infinitely into the future) in the way that a mere change
in entitlement rules does. Unlike an uncompensated legal change regarding
the availability of government relief for floods, the fact of the flood itself
does not mean that flooded land was always flooded. Nor, for that matter,
does it mean that the land became flooded sometime “before” the flood (in
analogy to a partially retroactive legal change) or sometime after it (in
analogy to a delayed effective date for a new legal rule). The
“announcement” date of the change to entitlements, in the case of a factual
change, is typically the same as the change itself. When it is not (as when
there is warning that a change will come), it still occurs on some particular
date, prior to which it had not occurred.
From the proposition that a legal transition implies only a change to
entitlement rules, it follows that the most one can say about the similarity of
legal change to factual or market change is that a legal transition plus a
transition rule that takes effect on the announcement date is “almost
precisely analogous” to market change.78 Only that combination of change
to entitlement rule and transition rule mimics a factual change, because only
that combination preserves the essential feature of factual change that need
not be present in legal change: the fact that the change is its own
announcement.
The problem, of course, is that this formulation
demonstrates that the analogy is entirely question-begging to the extent it
purports to support a presumption of enactment date effect without
transition relief, since the issues in the transitions literature are precisely
whether the new rule should take effect on the announcement date or on

78. Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 177; see also supra Part IV.A.
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some other date and whether transition relief should be available. In other
words, the analogical argument assumes its conclusion. If one presupposes
that a legal change is just like a factual change, then a legal change by
definition occurs on its date of announcement, and it should not be
surprising that the most efficient way to deal with it is the same as the most
efficient way to deal with natural or market-based changes. But the
question, of course, is whether the announcement date should be the same
as the effective date.
Indeed, it is precisely the fact that the announcement date of a new
legal rule can differ from its effective date that there is even a transitions
question in the first place. Consequently, to say that a transition norm of
having identical effective and announcement dates is like a factual change
is merely to state the consequence of one possible transition norm:
announcement date effectiveness. It does nothing to justify the transition
norm itself. One can state the point in the converse: if it were possible to
have unexpected factual developments take place on a date different from
their “occurrence,” would one assume that the optimal date would be the
occurrence date?
One might accept these observations but counter that they reflect a
merely semantic point: if one defines transition rules as meta-rules that
determine the temporal extension of entitlement rules, then of course any
legal transition that is not fully retroactive will be accompanied by a
transition rule and in that sense by transition “relief.” Is it not possible to
resolve the problem by saying that a legal transition consists of a change to
an entitlement rule plus a transition rule, which may or may not be explicit?
The argument would then be that legal changes, so defined, are just like
factual developments. They happen unannounced, taking effect from some
date forward, and we expect investors to deal with them through market
mechanisms.
The problem with this claim is that it is false. Legal changes differ
from factual developments only in that they can apply retroactively or
prospectively rather than when they are announced; as stated above, factual
developments are neither pre- nor post-announced. To say that investors
should bear the costs of legal transitions on analogy with natural or marketbased uncertainty disregards both the flexibility inherent in legal change,
which is that there is in principle much control over the effective-date
timing of the new entitlement rule, and the fact that it is just this flexibility
that gives rise to the “transition question” in the first place. If the flexibility
were lacking, there would be no transition debate, because all changes to
legal entitlements would (necessarily) occur on the date of announcement,
or perhaps on some other date, but in any case on a date over which one had
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no control.79 In short, the validity of the analogy presupposes the decision
that the best transition rule is the default rule for changes to positive law,
yet the analogy is used to justify that decision.
B.

Problems With a Single Transition “'orm”

Ultimately, the difficulties with the analogy of legal change to
factual or market-based change point to the crux of the problem with the
anticipations-based literature. As argued below, the failure to appreciate
fully either the flexibility or the limitations inherent in the power to adopt a
transition rule means that the new view literature fails to account for what is
distinctive about legal transitions. On the limitations side, it fails to
recognize that the markets that provide efficient methods for managing
risks and internalizing costs, and that serve as models for a legal transition
norm of announcement-date effectiveness, themselves depend upon the
existence of a stable legal regime that presupposes limits on possible
transition norms. Some of the norms advocated in the recent transitions
literature do not take cognizance of these limits. Put differently, certain
transition norms, including a universal norm of enactment-date effect with
no transition relief, would undermine regime stability and, hence, would
vitiate or destroy the markets that are supposed to function as models for
managing risk in the first place, including “transition risk.”
On the flexibility side, the new view fails to appreciate the
distinctive benefits that different transition “norms” can offer depending
upon the different type of, and justification for, the adoption of a new
entitlement rule. For example, there may be distinctive and systematic
reasons favoring greater retroactivity for judicial action than for legislative
action, and these reasons may relate to the type of legal change that the
respective legal actors initiate, rather than, for example, to the capacity of
the respective institutions to adopt “good” or “bad” law or to be influenced
by rent-seeking or other undesirable behavior.80 If one insists on treating all
79. Note that Kaplow himself does not accept the analogy fully, for if transition
uncertainty were “analytically equivalent to general market uncertainty,” Kaplow, Economic
Analysis, supra note 1, at 520, the notion that it might occasionally be appropriate to make
certain new rules nominally retroactive would be false, contrary to Kaplow’s assertion. Id.
at 551 (“Sometimes new legal rules should be made fully retroactive: they should be applied
to time periods before the enactment date, even as to investments no longer in existence.”).
80. The quality of the new entitlement as better or worse than the old one and the
differing possibilities for compromise of the legal actor’s efforts to act for a public benefit,
depending on the legal actor implementing the change, are the two bases that writers in the
new view have identified as reasons for different transition norms. Thus, Kaplow
acknowledges that different norms for different types of government actor may be
appropriate, but he does not ground the observation in the different natures of what the actor
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forms of government action as essentially the same, these distinctive
reasons become invisible.
In the following two subparts, I illustrate the limitations point by
considering the consequences of extending the default rules that apply to
judicial decisions to positive law, and the flexibility point by considering
the reverse extension. These potential extensions (or some other uniform
norm) should seem natural under a conception of legal change that insists
on effacing the distinctions among judicial, executive and legislative
decisions, because, under that conception, whatever the correct norm or
norms should be, they should not depend upon which government actor
initiates the change, but upon which rule provides the proper incentives to
legal actors.81
1.

Retroactive Relief—Naturalization of the Market

Consider first the consequences of extending the judicial rule of
nominal retroactivity to positive law. New view scholars have noted that
such a norm would have a chilling effect on investors, for the obvious
reason that investors would lack confidence that the rules on which they
relied in arranging their affairs would in fact be the rules applicable to their
affairs.82 Unless investors could be sufficiently certain either that current
law would not be changed unfavorably, or that if it did change, the
retroactive effect would not extend far enough back to reach their earlier
conduct, they would be unlikely to commit their resources in ways that
would otherwise be efficient. For example, taxpayers under a steady-state
income tax can be expected to allocate their resources in ways that favor
current consumption to a greater extent than do taxpayers under a steadystate consumption tax.83 Unless taxpayers believe they can make an
accurate prediction of the likelihood that a future transition to a
consumption tax will occur and will apply retroactively to pre-change

does; rather the focus is on the susceptibility of different government actors to different
forms of suboptimal behavior. Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 190–200.
81. Levmore, Changes, supra note 5, at 1672. To be clear, here I abstract from
considerations relating to “good government” concerns that might counsel in favor of
different norms for different government actors. See supra note 80. Rather the question is
whether the distinctive types of activity that different government decision-makers engage in
might support different transition norms for these actors. On this point the literature is
silent.
82. See, e.g., Levmore, Retroactive Taxation, supra note 11, at 277–78; SHAVIRO,
supra note 1, at 21–22.
83. For a general description of the incentive effects of income and consumption taxes,
see Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax
Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006).
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decisions, they are apt to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and to refrain from
committing resources either way.
This analysis, while technically correct, is importantly incomplete.
First, it is hard to square with new view theorists’ general skepticism about
the significance of the distinction between nominally retroactive legal
change and nominally prospective change that has retroactive effects.
Moreover, it has not been universally accepted. For example, Kaplow
argues in favor of a norm of nominal retroactivity when prior law was bad
law for the period it was in effect.84 More to the point, however, a nominal
retroactivity norm would do more than make investors hesitant to make
new investments for fear of expropriation of gains on repeal; it would create
enough uncertainty in the stability of established law to make reliance on
markets as a means of managing risk unreasonable altogether. Indeed, it
would make investors question the validity of the legal regime itself, and,
moreover, in ways that a norm of enactment-date effectiveness would not,
even if the impact on investments in the latter case were systematically
comparable to those in the former.
The difficulty stems from the fact that a norm of retroactivity of
positive law is inconsistent with the idea that law-making institutions derive
their authority from consent.85 Consider that a genuinely retroactive
pronouncement, such as a new rule for taxation of a prior year’s income,
does not merely call into question the firmness of any rule that one might
follow presently. It also implies that the currently operative legislature has
departed from the rules that determine who is the legislator; in particular, it
has usurped the role of the body that was authorized to act as legislator
during the period to which the nominally retroactive enactment applies. In
effect, individuals under the prior regime lived under no law. While that
period has of course passed, individuals in the current regime, anticipating
the possibility of future nominal retroactivity, find themselves under no law
at all. Further, they also find that they were actually not under law to the
extent they also were under prior law.
The point may be illustrated through the following example.
Suppose a neighbor appears at your doorstep with the pronouncement that
he has just proclaimed himself the law on the basis of his decision to amend
the Constitution, and that among other new rules taking immediate effect is
84. Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 551 (arguing that a “new rule” should
be applied retroactively when the new rule is better tailored than the old rule to the
circumstances that previously obtained).
85. See Harold M. Hochman, Rule Change and Transitional Equity, in
REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE 320, 331 (Hochman and Peterson eds., 1974)
(noting the problem of violation of consent that arises in the similar case in which earlier
generations set fixed rules for later ones).
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one that transfers all of your property to him. You might counter that his
proclamation has no legal effect because he hasn’t followed the rules set
forth in the Constitution that provide for its amendment to make him the
new legislator, but he replies that he has amended those as well.
Though fanciful, the example highlights what is problematic about
the case of nominally retroactive legislation. It, like the example, has a
boot-strapping quality. A prior legislature, elected to govern during a prior
term, followed procedures set forth in the relevant legal document to
establish the law that would apply during that period. Later representatives
(chosen by others) have now determined that that law did not apply during
that period. If that is true, then the substantive law operative during the
putative tenure of the prior legislature was not established by its electorate;
it was established by a subsequent electorate. The difficulty is that if law
derives from consent, then law that is not established with the consent of
the electorate is not really law for the electorate, any more than the law of
Latvia is the law of England. The enactment of such retroactively effective
legislation can only have been through a valid exercise of authority (rather
than through force) if either the subsequent legislature validly amended the
rules that determine who was authorized to promulgate substantive law
during the prior period, or the legislature in office during that period
authorized the subsequent legislature to override its enactments. In other
words, nominal retroactivity cannot go “all the way down” but must instead
be grounded in some procedure that is not itself open to retroactive
revision.
By hypothesis, the subsequent legislature did not follow the
procedures set forth in the relevant document that would permit
retroactivity of the change to a legal entitlement. Therefore, in order for the
retroactive legislation to have been valid, the principle that later legislatures
may retroactively revoke prior legislation must have been implicit in the
earlier enactment. If so, the case would be distinguished from that of the
neighbor, for whom no consent to adopt new rules is implied. The problem
with this argument is that once the idea is accepted that a subsequent
legislature can read tacit terms into prior legislation, there is no way to limit
this principle to the substantive statutory law; it could apply equally to any
subsequent statement that purports to set forth who is entitled to say what
the law is, including the neighbor’s claim about the earlier constitution.86
86. This observation may help to explain the courts’ oft-stated view that retroactivity
that extends to the beginning of the current legislative period raises no constitutional
question, but retroactivity extending much beyond it does. See U.S. v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,
38 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A period of retroactivity longer than the year
preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted would raise, in my view,
serious constitutional questions.”).
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The basic point may be stated as follows. From a conceptual standpoint, at
the top of the chain of authority must lie express, not merely tacit,
agreement by everyone who would be bound.87 That agreement cannot be
amended in ways inconsistent with its express terms other than by
unanimous consent; otherwise, any subsequent change lacks authority for
those who do not consent. This principle does not mean that even the
highest- level document cannot have procedures for amendment that call for
less than unanimity, but it does mean that a departure from the rules for
amending the highest-level document that are set forth in that document
would be invalid for anyone who opposed it.88
A proponent of the new view might respond to this argument by
raising the claim discussed previously: the significance to private actors of
their conduct is the results that it produces and not the means by which they
are produced.89 From this perspective, whether a new rule applies with
nominal retroactivity or merely affects the consequences of completed pretransition conduct going forward does not particularly matter. Since the
retroactive effect of nominally prospective changes is not inherently
problematic, it is not clear why we care about nominal retroactivity. In
other words, it does not matter whether the new rule affects new conduct or
the consequences of conduct that were its raison d’être. This argument,
however, simply assumes the conclusion that the distinction between preannouncement-date conduct and its future consequences is not significant,
because it assumes that legal rules do not depend upon consent to function.
If a transition norm vitiates that consent, there is literally no legal order; it
becomes impossible to act in any way other than as one in something like a
state of nature.
Another possible objection is that only a transition norm of nominal
retroactivity to positive law would call government legitimacy into
question, and that kind of nominal retroactivity is a relative rarity. But,

87. The claim is similar to Rousseau’s observation in On the Social Contract that
legitimate rule must be unanimously authorized. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 52 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978) (1762) (“The
law of majority rule is itself an established convention, and presupposes unanimity at least
once.”).
88. One could refine the point as follows: Certain tacit rules conceivably could be
derived, but they must derive from features of a relevant bargaining situation such that no
agent in that situation could rationally oppose them; identifying rules of this sort is the
subject of social contract theory. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). It is
difficult to see how one such rule would ever include an authorization for a legislature to
override a previous legislature with respect to the rules the previous legislature adopted for
the period during which it was to govern, unless the terms permitting such an override were
already expressly agreed to before the override occurred.
89. See supra Part II.B.
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again, the new view is predicated on the idea that the difference between
nominally retroactive and nominally prospective legal change is largely
illusory.90 The distinction is said to be material only in the sense that
nominally retroactive changes are likely to have a greater effect on the
magnitude of the legal change than are nominally prospective changes.91
Either of two possible conclusions follows. One is that there is, in fact, a
significant distinction between nominal prospectivity and nominal
retroactivity that is not captured in the difference between the size of the
effect of either on the market value of investments. The other would be that
even a norm of nominal prospectivity raises the stability question, since
certain nominally prospective changes can greatly alter the value of prechange investments. The former would demand a reconsideration of the
decision to differentiate nominal prospectivity from nominal retroactivity
on purely quantitative grounds, while the latter seems to be false: In many
cases, nominal prospectivity does not raise the same difficulties that
nominal retroactivity does, as evidenced by the fact that the strength of the
ANR norm is not matched by any comparable norm for purely prospective
legal change.92
These points may be summarized as follows. From the perspective
of the private investor, the significance of the ANR norm lies not simply in
the fact that it prevents application of new rules to investments already
made. It is that it gives expression in a particularly vivid manner to the idea
that, as a general matter, law under organized government derives from
consent.93 If law were the means by which an independently authorized or
naturally existing sovereign implemented its commands (such as a
philosopher king, for example), then neither instantaneously promulgated
nor retroactively extended legislation would raise a transition issue, apart
from the question of incentive effects amply discussed in the literature.94

90. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 515–16; Levmore, Retroactive
Taxation, supra note 11, at 266–78. See also Stark, supra note 64, at 154 (“Given
individuals’ forward-looking behavior, the difference between prospective laws and
retroactive ones is really just a matter of degree, not of kind.” (summarizing Graetz’s view)).
91. See Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, supra note 76, at 1826.
92. In some cases, nominal prospectivity does raise difficulties similar to those raised
by the nominal retroactivity case. In particular, where there is no meaningful change
between the circumstances of enactment and those of repeal, failure to provide some form of
transition relief starts to look like nominal retroactivity. These reasons are explored in the
next Part.
93. See Munzer, supra note 59, at 391 (“A retroactive law makes it difficult or
impossible to act with knowledge of the applicable law. The strongest way of putting this is
to say that if a law is retroactive, it logically cannot guide behavior with respect to the act
whose legal status is altered.”).
94. It should be noted, however, that if the law had this character, it is still not clear
that any incentive problem would exist. If government’s authority is predicated on its
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But where law is a means of government by consent, the strict separation
between the law-giver and the persons subject to law does not hold, and the
idea that laws need not be guides to conduct, which, in a certain sense,
investors apply to themselves, gives way. If law is law because it is
consented to, then a transition norm that vitiates consent vitiates law.
2.

Announcement Date Relief—New Interpretations As New Law

If the hypothetical extension of the rule for judicial interpretations
to positive enactments illustrates the failure of the new view to appreciate
the limitations that apply to the choice of transition norms, the inflexibility
of the new view emerges upon consideration of the converse case:
extension of the default norm of nominal prospectivity to judicial decisions
that announce new interpretations of existing rules.95 The difficulty here is
that it becomes impossible under the new view to make out a reason for
differing transition norms corresponding to differing methods of
propounding new rules, because, as previously discussed, the method by
which the government adopts a new rule is considered to be a formal or
arbitrary feature of the rule.
In conventional or “old view” terms, the basis for retroactivity of
judicial relief is, of course, that the pronouncement of a new interpretation
merely states what the law already was, or perhaps more realistically states
the “best” or “appropriate” interpretation among a small number of
candidates.96 To be sure, in some circumstances that notion is a fiction,97
but the norm, and certainly the justification commonly offered for the norm,
conforms to the idea.98 Under the new view, the rule for judicial “new

wisdom, then subjects should simply follow its commands. Rapid changes in the law would
not supply a basis for reticence about taking advantage of preferences, because the changes
would be correct.
95. For purposes of the discussion, I assume that parties would continue to have an
incentive to bring suit even where relief depended upon adoption of a novel and therefore
nominally prospective interpretation of existing law, since the question here relates to the
different matter of the larger consequences of a prospectivity norm. The principle could be
implemented by providing for a government payment to the aggrieved party where the court
found for the plaintiff on the basis of a novel interpretation of the law.
96. See Munzer, supra note 59, at 374–75; SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 112.
97. A salient example is the California Supreme Court’s adoption of a strict liability
standard for product defects. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963).
98. See SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 112 (“To some extent, the nominally retroactive
application of judicial decisions is logically inherent in what we call the judicial function.”);
see also, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, 511 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1994) (“It is this Court's
responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of
other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law. A judicial
construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well
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rules” therefore presents a puzzle: why have retroactivity for these rules if
a norm of nominal prospectivity should operate for positive law? If the
same general considerations apply regardless of the form in which a legal
transition occurs, it becomes difficult to explain different defaults for
different types of government action. While some new view scholars have
noted that different norms for different types of cases may be appropriate,
they have generally defended the idea with reference to the substance of the
underlying rule, not the form in which the new rule is promulgated. For
example, as previously mentioned, Kaplow supports a norm of nominal
prospectivity without transition relief for transitions that respond to
changed circumstances, but he argues for a norm of retroactive application
of new rules “when the justification for a reform suggests that the prior
activity was undesirable.”99 Needless to say, both a court and a legislature
(as well as an administrative agency or any other policy-making entity) can
be confronted with either type of case.
The case for retroactivity of judicial interpretation, however, has
nothing to do with whether the prior activity was undesirable. It has to do
with the fact that judicial action purports to be a statement of what the law
is, even though on occasion the statement may reflect a court’s view of
what it ought to be.100 At all events, the uncertainty that adjudication
resolves is very different from legislative uncertainty. Uncertainty about
the content of law is a feature of any legal system for the simple reason that
no law can contain a full specification of all cases to which it applies.101
That is why, as contrasted with legislation, adjudication typically resolves a
legal question in favor of one among a very small number of possible
interpretations. Each of these interpretations is typically known to the
litigants not only before trial but, in the ordinary case, at the time at which
they engage in the relevant conduct. Hence it is in this setting, much more
than in the legislative setting, that the case for retroactivity is strongest.
Where the legal risk is quantifiable beforehand, it is much easier to insure
against it. The fact of limited possible interpretive outcomes also places

as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.”); Id. at 313 n.12 (“[W]hen
this Court construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant
continuously since the date when it became law.”).
99. Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 551. See also Logue, Tax
Transitions, supra note 11, at 1154–58 (distinguishing the case for transition relief on the
basis of whether Congress has acted opportunistically or not, and on the basis of the leastcost avoider in the case of transitions motivated by the discovery of new information).
100. See, e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the
Perplexed 41–52 (University of Michigan Law School Working Paper No. 77) (developing a
positivist account of disagreement over theoretical legal principles), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968657 (last visited May 14, 2010).
101. Id. at 16.
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much less strain on concerns about rule of law than would the possibility of
open-ended retroactive application of new law, which can in principle have
any content. Finally, unlike positive law, in which it may make sense for
the party controlling its content to take account of the consequences of
changes to the content, new judicial interpretations are an inherent part of
the content, in the sense that any statement of a rule has possible ambiguity.
In short, because the new transitions literature disregards the different
nature of the uncertainty that legislation and adjudication resolve, the
distinctive justification for retroactive application of judicial interpretation
becomes unintelligible for the new view. That justification is ultimately the
same one that applies to rules more generally, which is that parties
nominally subject to them should, in fact, be subject to them, even if there
is by necessity some uncertainty in their content in borderline cases.102 In
this regard, the “new” legal rule that a tribunal may announce does not raise
the same concerns that nominally retroactive legislation does, because it is
grounded in the nature of law generally. Indeed, both the ANR norm and
the norm of nominal retroactivity for judicial decisions seem to derive from
the nature of law, or at least the nature of law as a means of rule by consent.
Where nominal retroactivity as a norm for legislation is inconsistent with
rule through law by consent, nominal retroactivity as a norm for
adjudication arises from the basic incompleteness of any law.
C.

The Conventional 'ature of Legal Regimes

Both of the problems of the new view literature described in the
preceding subparts point to a fundamental failure of proponents of the new
view to appreciate the conventional nature of law and therefore the
institutional context in which the transitions question arises at all. On one
hand, as artificial institutions, legal regimes are instantiations of convention
or agreement, and agreement is not subject to natural constraints. The
absence of natural constraint means that legal transitions can occur at times
different from their announcement dates and indeed at times that depart
from the announcement dates in ways that vary depending upon the types of
conventional settings in which the transition arises. While scholars writing
from a new-view perspective have of course entertained the possibility of a
norm for legal transitions that incorporates some amount of relief and some
amount of retroactivity, the literature has generally settled on a norm of
102. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) contains probably the
most famous articulation of this principle in the constitutional law context. See also
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69 (1765) (stating that
the court’s duty was not to “pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old
one.”), quoted in Munzer, supra note 59, at 374.
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enactment-date effectiveness because it cannot identify the institutional
reasons that would support a different date—namely, either prospective
effectiveness (or some transition relief variant thereof) for reliance-based
reasons when they might apply, or retroactive effectiveness for nominal
transitions that in fact further the principle or purpose of an already-enacted
rule. In short, the literature is unable to comprehend the variation that
arises from different institutional settings, rather than from either different
substantive settings, such as whether the underlying rule was good or bad,
or from the varying propensities of different actors to be subject to nonsocially optimizing conduct because of capture, principal-agent problems,
and the like.103
On the other hand, as artificial institutions of a certain sort, legal
regimes cannot be instantiations of just any convention. They must be
instantiations of conventions that are consistent with the terms of the
implicit bargain upon which the regime rests. By naturalizing the
circumstances within which legal transitions occur—for example, by
assuming the existence of well functioning markets no matter what the legal
regime—the transitions literature fails to appreciate the relationship
between transition norms and the set of legal institutions and relationships
that depend, in part, on those norms and that provide the framework within
which conventional arrangements, including markets generally and
insurance markets in particular, appear natural and are able to function. As
a result, the literature fails to appreciate an important set of considerations
at stake in adopting one set of norms rather than another in different
transition settings; it is able to comprehend the differences among possible
norms only in terms of the impact on private expectations under the
assumption that private expectations will not differ, for systematic reasons,
depending upon which governmental actor initiates the legal transition It is
not able to comprehend the varying impact of possible norms on the
persistence of the conventions that must persist for the legal regime to exist
at all.
These problems may be summarized with the observations that the
transitions question arises from the conventional nature of law and that any
attempt to answer that question without due regard for the distinctive nature
of convention is apt to fail. One could justifiably say, perhaps with some
irony, that the “nature” to which the new-view analysis appeals in analyzing
the legal transitions question (namely, markets) would not exist if a set of
conventions that themselves presuppose certain constraints on transition
norms were not also in place. These conventions are both more fragile and

103. For sample discussions of non-socially optimizing conduct, see generally SHAVIRO,
supra note 1, at 64–91.
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more flexible than that nature: more fragile in that they place limits on
transition “norms” that might otherwise appear more efficient, and more
flexible in that, unlike the natural events to which they are inappropriately
analogized, they may occur at times different from their “announcement.”
The conventional source of the transition problem is also the reason why
the appeal to the rules for market-based change as a basis for legal
transition policy is fundamentally unavailing. If what must be taken as
given is the possibility that the two dates differ (and it must if the transition
issue is to arise at all), then the appeal to the solution of having the dates be
the same where that solution presupposes that they are the same offers no
help whatever in analyzing the transition problem.
V.

RELIANCE AND REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

None of the observations made in the preceding part imply that the
actual policy recommendations of the recent transitions literature are
incorrect. Nor, conversely, does the fact that the law occasionally has been
applied in ways inconsistent with principles that support political stability
refute the observations made there, because the question is what an
appropriate transition norm should be, not what consequences follow from
the fact that the government occasionally has deviated from one norm or
another. What the observations do imply, however, is that any particular
transition norm must be evaluated with a view to the impact it will have
both on “investor” incentives and on the conditions that permit investors to
react to incentives effectively under law. When the new-view literature is
evaluated according to these criteria, it turns out that its recommendations
tend to be either uncontroversial—that is, not particularly different from
those of the “old view”—or questionable. In the end, the recent transitions
literature has little to say that is both new and true.104
In this part, I develop these claims through an examination of the
104. There appears to be some recognition of this claim in the literature. For example,
in his review of Shaviro’s book on legal transitions, Logue notes that the “concrete policy
payoff” of Shaviro’s extended argument is ultimately disappointing. Kyle D. Logue, If
Taxpayers Can’t Be Fooled, Maybe Congress Can: A Public Choice Perspective on the Tax
Transition Debate, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1507, 1509 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, Barbara Fried notes that the philosophical literature grounded in “luck
egalitarianism,” which is not significantly distinguishable in orientation from the “old view,”
has reached more or less the same set of policy recommendations as the new view. Barbara
Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 124 (2003) (“The organizing
premise of luck egalitarianism . . . that a just state would equalize the effects of brute luck on
individual endowments, but leave individuals to bear the consequences (good and bad) of
their choices . . . has led luck egalitarians to more or less the same conclusion that ‘rational
expectations’ economists have reached on welfarist grounds . . . .”).
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case for transition relief under nominally prospective legal change.
Prospective change is the focus here because I have already argued that the
transition literature’s arguments for nominally retroactive rules, or more
accurately its arguments for what is actually wrong with nominal
retroactivity of positive law, are unpersuasive.105 The first subpart reviews
the charge that reliance-based arguments for transition relief are circular.
Commentators have tended to make the conventional argument for reliance
against which this charge has been raised in two distinct settings, a fact
typically unnoticed in the recent transitions literature: to oppose the
nominal retroactivity of positive law, and to advocate transition relief for a
limited class of nominally prospective changes to the law.106 I argue that
although different justifications for the reliance argument apply in the two
settings, the blanket criticism offered under the new view has tended to
collapse the cases because new view scholars reject the idea that there is a
meaningful distinction between nominal retroactivity and nominal
prospectivity that has retroactive effect.107 The discussion in the previous
part has indicated why the distinction is meaningful and why reliance on the
notion that legal transitions will not generally be nominally retroactive is
reasonable.
The second subpart demonstrates that the case for reliance as a
basis for certain forms of relief from nominally prospective legal change is
perfectly sensible as well. As a general matter, many types of legal rules
can be analogized to conditional quasi-promises of one sort or another.
Where the original rule has this character, the question is whether the
conditions that would justify an uncompensated departure from the
continued operation of the rule obtain. If they do not, then relief—what is
called “transition relief”—is generally appropriate. If they do, all bets are
off and no transition relief would seem to be required—at least by the terms
of the original promise, though other reasons for relief might exist.
Underlying all of this is the view that reliance as a norm that ought to play
some role in the analysis is not entirely arbitrary. The fact that reliance
cannot justify itself does not mean that it is arbitrary. Rather, as argued
below, reliance derives its role from the nature of language. If words are to
mean something, then they must be able to be relied upon under certain
circumstances. The question is what those circumstances are.

105. See supra Part IV.
106. See, e.g., Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 522 n.26 (citing
commentary).
107. See supra Part III.
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The 'ew View Critique of Reliance

As previously discussed, under the new view, “transition relief”
should generally be denied because it creates an undesirable government
externality.108 The asserted parallel to market-based uncertainty is said to
justify this principle, while reliance and reasonable-expectations arguments
are said not to weigh in the other direction, because reliance and reasonable
expectations are second-order principles that depend upon underlying
practices.109 If absence of relief were the expectation, then reasonable
reliance would not supply a basis for relief. I have argued that the positive
part of the argument—the analogy of legal change to market-based
changes—fails because various aspects of the legal regime on which
markets depend cannot be assumed to persist under certain transition
norms, such as a norm of extensive retroactivity to positive law.110 More
generally, I have suggested that the positive case for a norm of no relief, to
the extent it rests on the analogy, is conceptually flawed because it
presupposes the transition rule it purports to justify.111
In this subpart, I focus on the charge of circularity as applied to the
reliance norm. As contrasted with the positive case that, for example,
Kaplow and Graetz make for no transition relief,112 this negative part of the
argument is perfectly valid as far as it goes. One cannot justify transition
relief on the basis of reasonable reliance or rational expectations without
justifying the practice upon which the expectations are based, for if the
practice were different, then rational expectations and reasonable reliance
would differ too.113 Therefore one would need to justify the underlying
practice in order to defend the reliance principle.

108. Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 531. See also Graetz, Legal
Transitions, supra note 1, at 77–78; Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, supra note 76, at 1823–
24; and SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 2–3, for further discussion of this issue. Kaplow also
considers and rejects other arguments that might support transition relief. These include
forcing the government to internalize harms, more fairly distributing the burdens and
benefits of government, and maintaining horizontal equity. Kaplow, Transition Policy,
supra note 2, at 170. I do not discuss them here.
109. See supra Part III.
110. For purposes of this discussion, I bracket the point made earlier that Kaplow does
not articulate a well-defined concept of transition relief. See supra Part III.A.
111. See supra Part IV.A.
112. See supra Part III.
113. In essence, in Kaplow’s view the most that could be said about the expectations
argument is that it raises the question of the proper transition to the proper transition regime.
Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 557–60. Kaplow notes that the questions this
issue raises are distinct from those of the proper “steady state” transition policy. Since it is
currently reasonable to expect transition relief, it may not be appropriate to move to another
transition norm without offering second-order transition relief. Id.
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The important point about this criticism is that, in principle, it is not
inconsistent with the old view. Stated somewhat differently, a proponent of
the old view is not committed to extensive relief for nominally prospective
changes to positive law as a general matter, or even to the idea that
transition relief should operate as a default for such transitions. These
conclusions should not be surprising, since the validity of the circularity
charge does not depend upon anything about either the consequentialist
view of legal transitions or the anticipations-oriented approach. For the
same reason, the suggestion that the old view uncritically favors transition
relief on the basis of reliance represents something of an overstatement.114
Old-view scholars have not typically offered free-floating reliance
arguments in favor of transition relief for nominally prospective transitions.
Although not always clearly articulated, the arguments for such relief (as
contrasted with relief from nominally retroactive enactments) generally
have applied to a relatively narrow range of enactments.
Graetz’s discussion of reliance arguments in the prior literature is
illustrative of the tendency to group together reliance arguments made
against nominal retroactivity with reliance arguments made against the
failure to provide transition relief for nominally prospective transitions.
Graetz quotes the following statement by Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy during the first Nixon
Administration, in support of his claim about the predominance of the oldview way of thinking:
[P]rovisions have been deliberately kept in the tax law over
many years, and they constitute standing invitations for
taxpayers to erect new buildings, drill for oil, or embark on
programs of charitable contributions. Even if we should
conclude that it would be unwise to continue some of these
benefits or if we should alter some of them, it would not be
appropriate to remove the preference precipitously after
taxpayers have embarked on programs which they might
not have adopted except for these provisions.115

114. Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, supra note 76, at 1823 (“In short, the argument
asserts that people have a right to protection merely because either they now expect such
protection or they expected such protection when they entered into a transaction; their
expectations allegedly create a right and their asserted rights legitimate their expectations.”);
Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 170 (“[I]t is increasingly recognized that
arguments based on actors’ reliance on and expectations concerning existing law are circular
and otherwise deficient.”).
115. Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 74 (quoting Cohen, supra note 15, at
327).

2010]

LEGAL TRA'SITIO'S

159

Graetz goes on to observe that “[a]n argument in this form, without
more, ends analysis.”116 But the observation, while true, is of limited
relevance. Rarely have arguments for reasonable reliance been made
simply on the basis that reliance alone justifies relief.
Indeed Cohen’s statement represents a quite limited call for
reliance-based relief. As the latter part of the quotation intimates, Cohen is
discussing the repeal or limitation of specific items of tax preference, not all
proposed changes to the tax law, a point confirmed by other parts of his
text.117 In fact, in the same statement to Congress, Cohen advocates some
changes to existing law that would be effective retroactive to the date he
made the statement.118 The reason for this limited retroactivity is that the
provisions to which it applies are intended to correct unintended errors
contained in, or opportunities for abuse offered under, prior law.119 Thus, if
Cohen is guilty of anything regarding the reliance argument, it is his failure
to identify which of the conventional justifications for protection of reliance
interests apply when Congress repeals tax preference items on the basis of
new policy judgments.
A similar example is found in Kaplow’s work. He states:
One of the most commonly noted arguments against
allowing private actors to bear losses resulting from
changes in government policy is that they reasonably relied
on preexisting law in making investment decisions. Many
legal theorists, however, have long recognized the
circularity of such arguments, which implicitly assume that
it is reasonable to expect laws never to change . . . .120

116. Id.
117. Graetz omits the first word of the first sentence quoted: “These.” It refers to what
Cohen calls “the major tax preferences.” Cohen, supra note 15, at 327. They include such
items as accelerated depreciation deductions, tax incentives for oil exploration, and
charitable-contribution deductions. Id.
118. See, e.g., id. at 336 (“We believe that the distortions of income tax liability
involved in [so-called ABC transactions involving mineral production payments], and
increasing utilization in various extractive industries, indicate that these distortions should be
terminated promptly . . . . We recommend, therefore, that this provision be enacted as
promptly as possible and be effective with respect to transactions consummated, or covered
by a binding contract entered into, on or after April 22, 1969 [i.e., the date Cohen delivered
the statement to the House Ways and Means Committee]. The industries involved have had
adequate notice that the tax treatment of production payments was under reconsideration.”).
119. Id. at 346–47.
120. Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 522 (footnotes omitted).
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Although Kaplow notes that whether reliance is in fact appropriate
depends on the circumstances of each case, he does not explore what
factors are or should be relevant in the various cases. Rather he tends to
discount the reasonableness of reliance altogether.121
Perhaps ironically, one reason that new view scholars may have
tended to overstate the role reliance arguments play under the old view is
their insistence on regarding nominally retroactive enactments as essentially
similar to nominally prospective enactments that have retroactive effects.
Once one has effaced the distinction between nominally prospective and
nominally retroactive legal change, there is not much point in
distinguishing between old-view discussions in which reliance is featured
as a defense to nominal retroactivity from those in which it is raised as a
defense to transition relief understood in the conventional, that is, forwardlooking, sense.
Indeed, many of the discussions to which the new-view theorists
point as examples of excessive deference to reliance arguments concern
nominally retroactive statutes, not transition relief offered in the context of
nominally prospective legal change.122 But the old view does not efface the
distinction between nominally retroactive legal change and the purportedly
retroactive effects of nominally prospective legal change, for the reasons
discussed previously. As a consequence, the old view’s near-blanket
rejection of nominal retroactivity on reliance grounds is perfectly
compatible with a much more skeptical view of reliance as a basis for
transition relief.123 The distinction seems simply to be lost on new view

121. Id. at 525. See also Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 170 (“Although
commonplace in most transition settings, it is increasingly recognized that arguments based
on actors' reliance on and expectations concerning existing law are circular and otherwise
deficient.”).
122. For example, three of the four commentaries that Kaplow cites in support of the
pervasiveness of the reliance norm are expressly concerned with the validity of reliance
arguments against nominally retroactive legislation. See Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra
note 1, at 522 n.26 (citing Committee on Tax Policy, Tax Section, New York State Bar
Association, Retroactivity of Tax Legislation, 29 TAX LAW. 21, 22–23 (1975); Note, Setting
Effective Dates for Tax Legislation: A Rule of Prospectivity, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436, 439–42
(1970); Alan S. Novick & Ralph I. Petersberger, Retroactivity in Federal Taxation: Part II,
37 TAXES 499, 499–504 (1959). The fourth commentary adduces reliance as a basis for
compensation in the case of prospective changes to zoning laws. Id. (citing Developments in
the Law: Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1494–96 (1978)). Even here, however, the cited
author notes that the strength of the reliance argument varies with the nature of the zoning
ordinance on which it is based. Id. at 1495–96. In their counterpart discussions of the old
view of reliance, Graetz and Logue cite some of the same literature. See Graetz, Legal
Transitions, supra note 1, at 73 n.78; Logue, Tax Transitions, supra note 11, at 1136 n.27.
123. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, at 346 (advocating an effective date of the date of
announcement before committee for a provision designed to correct an error in the tax law).
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scholars.124
Correlatively, and not surprisingly, the idea that reliance interests
support transition relief for all nominally prospective changes to the tax law
does not appear ever to have been seriously entertained by anyone, a point
well recognized in the transitions literature itself. For example, changes in
tax rates,125 including rates on capital income, never have been
accompanied by relief, and serious arguments for relief for such changes
have not been made.
Similarly, provisions designed to address
arrangements that comply with the law but do not produce tax results
considered appropriate often have been enacted with at least some
retroactive effect.126 Outside of the tax area, various changes to the legal
landscape routinely have substantial adverse impacts on individuals who
have relied on prior law, but the idea that Congress should make extensive
grandfathering relief available is not entertained. In short, the types of legal
change for which reliance-based transition relief (as opposed to reliancebased relief against nominally retroactive legislation) has been advocated
have generally been considered changes to provisions that invited reliance
for reasons other than the mere fact that they were law.
B.

The Positive Case for Reliance

In this subpart I argue that the same considerations that support
distinguishing between market-based transitions and legal transitions
support the introduction of a concern with reliance. In the end, the concern
rests on an acknowledgment that legal rules, and hence changes to legal
rules, derive from authority that is based in large measure on consent. This
feature of legal rules is to be contrasted with unanticipated market-based
changes, which simply happen. Consent implies that whoever has authority
to effect a legal change of one type or another has the authority on the basis
124. Graetz remarks that “[t]he evaluation of claims for transitional relief should be
guided not by the existence of expectations, but rather by some independent normative
vision of what people should be entitled to expect.” Graetz, Retroactivity Revisited, supra
note 76, at 1823. The statement is true, but without more, it does not demonstrate that
reliance arguments may not succeed in explaining why transition relief should be offered in
certain circumstances.
125. Although most ordinary income is taxed in the year earned, and hence does not
raise a transition question assuming there is no nominal retroactivity to a later change in law,
a long-term contract entered into under prior law would raise a transition issue. Thus, a
taxpayer who entered into a multi-year contract when the applicable marginal was 25%
would not be thought entitled to have that rate grandfathered if rates went to 35% before the
term of the contract.
126. See Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation, 84 HARV. L. REV. 436, 438–
42 (1970) (noting retroactive aspects of tax legislation).
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of some sort of agreement, however attenuated, between those who
promulgate the new rule and those who are subject to it. To the extent that
the presence or absence of transition relief bears on reasonable assumptions
about the government actor’s conformity with that agreement, reliance may
or may not be appropriate.
Underlying this view is the assumption that some positive case for
reliance exists, for the circularity critique of reliance demonstrates that the
fact of reliance cannot, by itself, establish the reasonableness of reliance.
At its core, this positive case is the same in the transitions setting as in
others. It is simply that if an announced legal rule is to have an effect on
the conduct of parties to whom it purports to apply, they must have some
basis to believe in a correspondence between that statement of the rule and
the rule that turns out to apply in fact.127 In other words, they must believe
it is the actual rule. If the expectation of correspondence is lacking, the
statement of the rule would be pointless. This expectation is a feature of
language and represents a second difference between natural or marketbased change and legal change. Whereas the fact of natural change simply
presents itself to investors who must deal with it, the “fact” of legal change
depends for its facticity upon the acceptance of those to whom the
statement of the legal rule applies. A statement of the rule must have some
basis to be trusted if it is to be accepted as the actual rule. That, of course,
does not mean the statement is to be taken as true no matter what. There
may be explicit or implicit caveats on the circumstances in which it will
continue to be the rule, but if there are no norms whatever that limit the
authority of the lawmaker to withdraw or change the rule, then there is no
basis to consider the statement of the rule to be true in the first place.128
These observations indicate that the question is how the fact that a
legal change concerns prospectively rather than retroactively effective rules
alters the case against protection of reliance interests. What is it about the
fact that a new rule is made to operate solely with nominally prospective

127. The reliance argument is sometimes framed as resulting from a notion of quasicontract between the government and private actors. It is better framed as resulting from a
quasi-promise, both because reliance damages can arise out of promissory obligations and
because there is no analog to consideration in contract that runs from those subject to legal
rules to those who promulgate them.
128. Indeed one could reasonably characterize the central task of modern political
theory beginning with Hobbes as finding a way to ensure that and which statements of legal
rules may be relied upon. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 129 (Michael Oakeshott
ed., 1962) (arguing that security is possible only in civil society in which a single legislator
has the power to announce and enforce the law); IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND
OTHER ESSAYS 79 (Humphrey trans.1983) (arguing that the concept of right requires a sole
legislator possessing unlimited power to impose coercive law as long as it is not selfcontradictory as law).
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effect, rather than with expressly retroactive effect as well, that justifies less
solicitude for expectations regarding the fixity of legal rules? Why, in
short, is changing the future different from changing the past? The
following sections address these questions by focusing on the possible
causes of legal change. Notably, one of these sources—a change in
circumstances—can occur solely going forward, whereas the other, a
change in judgment about the advisability of a rule can occur both going
forward and going back.
In order to illustrate the basis for limited claims of reliance, in the
following subparts I explore its role in two settings, with the second setting,
in turn, having two variations of its own. Each of the two broader settings
involves the repeal of the municipal bond interest exclusion. Throughout, I
assume that Congress initially adopted the exclusion because Congress had
concluded that state activities should be subsidized by the federal
government on a steady-state basis and that the exclusion was an
appropriate method for doing so. The question is whether transition relief
should accompany a repeal of the exclusion.
1.

First Case: Change in Material Circumstances

Under the old view, it would seem that whether repeal of an
incentive provision such as the interest exclusion for municipal bonds
merits some sort of transition relief depends upon the reasons for the repeal.
Suppose in the first case that Congress repeals the exclusion in response to
an unforeseen change of material circumstances, such as a need to raise
revenue. Under these circumstances it does not seem that transition relief
should be expected, though one could imagine reasons why in any
particular case it might be made available. In this setting, one could well
say—and it seems for reasons well documented in the literature, it would be
preferable to say—that no transition relief should be in the offing absent
significant distributional or other considerations that would make relief a
good idea, because it remains unclear why relief should presumptively
apply when the conditions under which it makes sense to offer the
preference no longer obtain. There is no obvious reason why investors
ought not to be charged with assuming the risk that if circumstances make
the law a bad idea, they ought not be entitled to enjoy the benefits of the
law.129 After all, the decision to offer the preference was made, implicitly
or not, on the basis that the circumstances made the preference a good idea.
There is never certainty about the future, and it is difficult to see why the
government, rather than investors, presumptively ought to absorb the costs
129. SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 48.
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of unexpected developments that make existing law non-optimal.
2.

Second Case: Change in Legislative Judgment

Contrast the preceding situation to this second case, in which repeal
rests upon a new policy evaluation of essentially the same basic
circumstances. Here the material conditions that were thought to support
the preference have not changed; rather Congress has reconsidered the
wisdom of the initial decision to offer the preference under those
circumstances. This case presents, in turn, two variations. The first is
where the same legislative body is in place at all relevant times, while in the
second a subsequently elected legislature initiates the transition.
(a)

First Variation: Same Elected Body

In the first variation, the same elected body both enacts and repeals
the tax preference—again, with no change in material conditions. The
critical issue in this setting is the fact that the passage of time really should
play no normative role. As a first step in the analysis, consider the
difference between a preference that provides benefits on an immediate
basis, such as the deduction for certain research and experimentation
expenditures,130 and a preference the benefits of which materialize over
time, such as the bond interest exclusion.
If the research and
experimentation deduction were enacted in Year 1 and repealed
prospectively in Year 2, all of the benefits expected from expenditures
already made by the time of the repeal would have been realized. By
contrast, a prospective, non-grandfathered repeal of the bond interest
exclusion would preclude investors from reaping any of the benefits
expected to be realized in the future.131 Despite these different timing
results, it is by now a familiar truth that on a steady-state basis the two
methods of providing a benefit differ only in formal terms.132 Assuming no

130. I.R.C. § 174 (2010).
131. See supra Part III.B.
132. This result is a statement of the so-called Cary Brown Theorem. Cary Brown,
Business Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC
POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300 (1948). It depends upon certain
simplifying assumptions that are not relevant to the present analysis, such as that the relevant
tax rates are the same at all times and that the investor can make full, current use of the
deduction for the initial investment.
Kaplow discusses this equivalence, as well as the economic equivalence between a nongrandfathered repeal of benefits that had been anticipated to accrue in the future and the
same repeal coupled with taxing back benefits that had been provided as an up-front subsidy.
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change in law, one could offer the same benefit that the bond interest
exclusion provides by permitting a deduction for the purchase price of the
bond in the year of purchase and taxing all subsequent returns (principal
and interest) as they are received.133 Under either model, the relevant
investor decision occurs in the pre-repeal period, but under the deductioninclusion model, a prospective, non-grandfathered repeal would not
preclude realization of any benefits that investors would be awaiting under
the interest exclusion model. In this context, the material equivalence of
the two methods under steady states, coupled with the previously made
argument against the propriety of nominal retroactivity, seems to indicate
that grandfathering is appropriate on repeal where Congress chooses to
make the form of the preference require its persistence into future periods in
order to be fully realized.
The obvious response to this argument is that it seems to prove too
much, for the same could be said of the case previously described, in which
repeal takes place under changed circumstances. In that setting it was
suggested that Congress’s decision to implement the tax benefit in the form
of an interest exclusion rather than as an up-front deduction signaled that
investors are at risk of no relief in the event of repeal.134 The argument just
offered, however, suggests that the equivalence under certain background
assumptions of an up-front deduction with an exclusion over time means
the same total benefits should be made available on repeal in either case. It
therefore might seem that both claims cannot be correct, but this suggestion
rests upon a failure to account for the decisive difference that the different
background conditions make for the two cases. It is precisely the fact that a
forward-looking preference presupposes appropriate material conditions
that makes appropriate a presumption of no relief when these conditions
change. In other words, a forward-looking preference signals that Congress
intends the preference to be available only as long as the conditions that
make it appropriate persist. As long as there is no change in material
circumstances, the forward-looking preference and the immediate
preference remain indistinguishable, for the risk assumed under the

See Kaplow, Transition Policy, supra note 2, at 188–89. See also SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at
218 (noting the equivalence in the methods for the municipal bond case).
133. Consider a taxpayer in the 30% tax bracket who earns $100 and uses the after-tax
proceeds to purchase a ten-year municipal bond that pays 10% annually. Under the interest
exclusion regime, she pays $30 in tax on her earnings, purchases a $70 bond, receives $7
annually in untaxed interest, and receives her $70 back at term tax-free. Under the
deduction regime, she pays no tax on the $100 of earnings, purchases a $100 bond, earns
$10 annual interest on which she pays $3 tax, and receives her $100 back at term, at which
time she pays $30 in tax.
134. See generally Logue, Tax Transitions, supra note 11, at 1181–94, for a discussion
of methods by which Congress might bind itself to transition relief.
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forward-looking preference has not materialized, and it was that risk that
justified the presumption against transition relief.
One might accept that a difference between changed material
circumstances and changed legislative judgments has some significance for
transition policy, but query why investors might not also assume the risk of
no relief in the changed-judgment case when a preference is adopted on a
forward-looking rather than an immediate basis. The difficulty is that if
such a presumption obtained, then the enactment of a tax preference whose
benefits extended to future periods would rationally be viewed as
equivalent, at the front end, to Congress’s saying that it does not want to
provide the preference on a steady-state basis under the existing facts, for if
it did it would have made the preference available as an immediate
deduction. It is entirely unclear why such a signaling presumption should
operate. It needlessly limits Congress’s ability to offer tax benefits in the
form it prefers, when Congress can limit the benefits on enactment directly,
simply by sunsetting the preference or by making it otherwise conditional.
For although a deduction and an exclusion may be the same on a steadystate basis, they have different properties with respect to transition periods,
and Congress might well prefer to plan for the possibility of changed
material circumstances in designing the tax preference; removing the
presumption that any forward-looking preference comes with a risk of
uncompensated change even where material conditions do not change
leaves that flexibility available. Consider that where a change in
circumstances makes the preference a bad policy idea, having offered the
exclusion is cheaper than having offered the deduction precisely because
the exclusion’s benefits materialize later than the deduction’s; the forgone
revenue under the exclusion is always less than under the deduction as long
as any bonds are outstanding on the repeal date. Because a rejection of the
presumption of no relief when relevant circumstances have not changed
does not entail rejecting the presumption when they have changed, there is
no benefit to be had from adopting the presumption.
Note, further, that the availability of means by which to make relief
tentative other than by having a presumption of no transition relief when the
facts have not changed makes the decision not to offer transition relief in
this context irrational. There is literally no relevant difference on a steadystate basis between the deduction method and the exclusion method, and
given that the case under consideration involves no material change to the
facts, the potential penalty of non-grandfathered repeal would indeed
depend upon “mere accounting considerations,”135 because what obtains is,

135. SHAVIRO, supra note 1, at 106. Shaviro uses the quoted language to describe the
definition of nominal retroactivity.
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in effect, a steady state. And this equivalence indicates, in turn, that failure
to provide grandfathering relief in the no-change-of-circumstances case is
analytically equivalent to nominally retroactive taxation. In other words,
the relevant difference between prospective repeal without relief and
retroactive taxation is that one can rationally consider investors to have
assumed the risk of changed material circumstances that may make current
law sub-optimal, but not that they have assumed the risk of a mere change
of mind. And the reason they have not assumed it illustrates the relevance
of reliance. If words (statutes, rules, etc.) are to have meaning, then in the
absence of a change to the circumstances in which they are set forth, one
must be able to rely on them. The assumption of the former risk is what
justifies a presumption of no relief on repeal when circumstances do
change. The new transitions literature has made this point, but it has not
adequately distinguished between that case and the change-of-mind case.136
Where there are no changed circumstances, the difference between changes
that illicitly reach back into the past and those that account for new present
and future conditions disappears, because the past and the future are
relevantly the same. The implication of the equivalence, however, runs in
the opposite direction from that assumed by the new transitions literature:
where conditions do not change, forward-looking un-grandfathered repeal,
at least of incentive provisions, is analytically equivalent to illicit nominal
retroactive taxation.
(b)

Second Variation: Subsequently Elected Body

Under the second variation of the case in which material
circumstances have not changed, the question is whether the analysis runs
differently if the repealing body differs from the enacting body. More
precisely, the question is whether this difference changes the
reasonableness of a presumption that investors do not run the risk of an
uncompensated repeal of a preference where the material conditions
supporting its prior enactment have not changed. The analysis under first
variation indicated that failure to offer relief was not rational, because there
is no advantage to be gained from the presumption that relief would not be
forthcoming. A significant difference does exist, however, between that
case and the case in which a new legislature repeals the preference. It is to
be found in the parallelism between the latter situation and nominally

136. Kaplow, for example, notes that where changes to the facts (as opposed to a reevaluation of the wisdom of a rule) give rise to a legal transition, retroactive effectiveness
would not be appropriate. Kaplow, Economic Analysis, supra note 1, at 551. See, e.g.,
supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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retroactive positive law. The principal objection to such law, it will be
recalled,137 was that it supplanted the elected legislature with a different,
and unauthorized, legislative body. The converse problem arises in the
present case. Where the previously enacted tax preference materializes
during future legislative periods, a requirement of relief on repeal (where
material circumstances have not changed) threatens to supplant the current
legislature with the past one. In the extreme, the present legislature would
be precluded from doing anything at all in the absence of a change in
material circumstances, if offering relief under prior law required its
extension sufficiently far into the future.138
The same considerations also indicate that the rationality objection
to the presumption of no relief in the same-legislature case does not apply
here. The rationality objection rests on the assumption that a rational
legislature, though it may change its mind, makes provision for doing so ex
ante, when it enacts a provision. Under that assumption, a legislature
rationally signals a decision to make preferences tentatively available under
steady-state conditions expressly, by enacting a provision for a limited
period of time, rather than by entertaining a presumption of no relief on
repeal. Once the assumption is abandoned that the same legislature that
enacts the provision repeals it, no inference about the course of future
legislative conduct follows from the enactment of a relief provision in one
form rather than another. Accordingly, no inconsistency or irrationality
automatically results from a failure to provide relief on repeal of a forwardlooking tax preference where material conditions have not changed.
By the same token, the problem of potentially binding future
legislatures does not point to an automatic presumption of no relief where
the repealing legislature differs from the enacting one, but rather to the need
for a balancing of considerations. On one hand, prior legislatures ought not
be considered to bind future legislatures on matters of policy judgment. On
the other hand, the same considerations of flexibility operate in this setting
as in the same-legislature setting. Since investors know that legislatures
change periodically, the same questionable incentives would be created if
all bets were automatically off with every election. At the other extreme,
an obvious effort to lock in changes in law by enacting forward-looking

137. See supra Part IV.B.
138. Thus, one could imagine a case in which a late-term Congress passes a suite of
relief provisions all of which materialize over ten or more years, and where the reason for
passing the provisions in this form was to lock in current legislative judgments. This
example has a parallel in the case of executive action, where an executive about to leave
office issues or finalizes a large number of orders and regulations to entrench its policy
preferences. See Nina Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policy and Personnel
Before a 'ew President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003).
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reforms that necessarily materialize over long periods of time ought not be
respected by a future legislature that wishes to pursue different priorities or
takes a different view of the effectiveness of prior policies. Hence one
would expect to find a variety of outcomes in this setting, depending upon
the particular circumstances under which the preference was enacted.
A final point is in order here, and it illuminates one reason that no
clear transition norms have in fact emerged, and why they are unlikely to.
In this subpart I have assumed that one can divide cases according to
whether or not relevant material circumstances have changed. In practice,
the classification of actual cases is likely to be contested because
circumstances are constantly changing, and it will frequently be an open
question whether the circumstances that have changed are material to a
change in law. Wholly apart from concerns of public choice—paying off
constituencies, log-rolling and the like—the question of relief is contestable
simply because of the difficulties in classifying cases. Hence one would
expect to see what one does see in the transition context: a variety of
transition rules for seemingly similar cases.
C.

The Linguistic Basis of Reliance

I have argued that some basis for reliance is implicit in any
statement of a legal rule, because it is a requirement of a statement of what
the rule is that it be able to be relied upon under at least some
circumstances. If language did not have this character, it would be
meaningless. Accordingly, the question for reliance analysis becomes what
those circumstances are. The fact that some basis for reliance is
presupposed in any statement of the rule does not mean that reliance is
always or even mostly appropriate. It simply means that one must
distinguish the cases in which reliance is or should be implied from those in
which it need not.
The preceding discussion has suggested what the outer limits of a
rational norm of no reliance would be. It is a possible rational norm that all
bets are off when the circumstances under which a prior rule was adopted
have changed. That is, there is nothing incoherent about an implicit norm
that legal rules may be relied upon only as long as the conditions that gave
rise to their adoption obtain. But I also have noted that a change in material
circumstances is not the only occasion for a change in legal rules.
Sometimes rules change simply because the legislator has changed its mind
about the advisability of the rule even though the circumstances that gave
rise to the rule have not changed. In that case, a refusal to protect reliance
interests when the rule changes, at least where it is the same legislator that
adopted the original rule, becomes inconsistent with the idea that the
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legislator rationally states the legal rule in the first place. It is not really
distinguishable from someone’s pronouncing that p, and then immediately
pronouncing that not-p. That is, there is something incoherent in an
implicit norm that says legal rules may never be relied upon, or may not be
relied upon when they are reversed by the same legislator that adopted them
when there has been no relevant change to the conditions under which they
were adopted. If that were not the case, then one could not rely, for
example, on the statements made by anyone, including in a contract or, for
that matter, in any other setting.
The new view theorists, by failing to distinguish between these
different circumstances of legal change, reach the conclusion that a norm of
no reliance could be perfectly coherent and that for other reasons, it may
well be. There is some irony in the fact that that view is to some extent
undermined by their own occasional acknowledgment that a norm of
nominal retroactivity would frustrate investor expectations:139 If there is no
significant difference, other than in degree, between nominal retroactivity
and nominal prospectivity, then there ought not be a concern about adopting
a norm of nominally retroactive legislation if reliance interests are circular
and not independently justifiable. Conversely, if that concern is valid, then
it ought to apply with nearly equal force to uncompensated, nominally
prospective change, the only difference being the aforementioned one of
degree.140 In that case reliance lives. Because the new view does not pay
sufficient heed to the distinction between a change in facts and a change in
the rule that applies to those facts, it is unable to explain why either its
concerns about nominally retroactive rules ought not apply to protect
reliance interests or, conversely, why a norm of nominal retroactivity ought
not apply to changes in positive law. For what is quintessential to a
nominally retroactive change, but is typically absent in a nominally
prospective change, is that circumstances have not changed at all: The past
is what it is.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The new transitions literature does not appear to offer particularly
robust policy recommendations. For the most part, the recommendations
are either consistent with those that a proponent of the old view might offer,
or questionable. I have argued that the principal reason for the failings of
139. See, e.g., Levmore, Retroactive Taxation, supra note 11, at 278 (observing that
repeated use of retroactive taxation would undermine its usefulness as a surprise to raise tax
revenue efficiently).
140. See supra Part II.A.
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the literature is that it does not pay heed to the specific conditions under
which legal transitions occur.
These conditions are importantly
conventional, and because they are conventional, the preconditions to the
conventions must be satisfied if the conventions are to persist; if the
preconditions do not persist, then law itself is called into question. The old
view gives expression to the preconditions in recognizing, even if not
always with sufficient precision, the relevance of the distinction between
nominally retroactive and nominally prospective legal change, or between
law-making and law discernment.141 In something of an irony, the analogy
the new transition literature uses to justify a particular set of norms holds
only because these conventionally established conditions obtain and thereby
appear natural, but the conditions themselves would not obtain if the rules
the new transitions literature offers for many cases became transition
norms.
The considerations developed here also suggest that if the authority
of the lawmaker did not depend for the most part on the convention that the
lawmaker expresses the will of a consenting body, most of the difficulties
described in this Article would disappear. In that case, transition norms
would not affect the conditions that make action under law possible,
because they would not call into question the regime that individuals must
presuppose in order for law and institutions that depend on law, such as
markets, to exist. However, the connection between political and legal
authority on one hand, and the will of the individuals subject to law on the
other, is more than incidental to the existence of the legal regime. The
connection means that transition norms are both more limited and more
flexible than the recent transitions literature has recognized. They are more
limited because they must respect the idea that law derives from an
electorate that is self-governing. Both nominal retroactivity in many
circumstances, and immediate nominal prospectivity in fewer
circumstances, are inconsistent with this idea. Transition norms are more
flexible because they may vary according to the type of legal transition that
different institutions, based upon different conventions, engage in.
In one sense, these criticisms can be traced back to a fundamental
tenet of the new transitions literature, articulated first by Graetz, developed
by Kaplow, and given perhaps its most comprehensive explication by
Shaviro. This is the idea that new rules have a retroactive effect when they
have an impact on the future consequences of decisions made prior to the
adoption of the rule. The idea that such transitions “reach back into the
past,” in Shaviro’s formulation, implies that one cannot meaningfully
distinguish between legal transitions that apply by their terms to completed

141. See, e.g., Novick & Petersberger, supra note 122, and authorities cited therein.
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conduct and those that apply to the present and future consequences of
completed conduct—conduct that projects itself into, and assumes the risks
of, future developments, whether they be changed material circumstances
or different lawmakers with different policy judgments. It is on the basis of
this view that the new transitions literature downplays, if it does not
dismiss, the distinction between nominal retroactivity and nominal
prospectivity that has retroactive effect. The considerations developed in
this Article explain why it is sensible to draw a distinction in kind between
forward-looking reforms and nominally retroactive ones, and why one
might want to reserve the term retroactive for the latter as well as, perhaps,
for future consequences of past actions where the distinction between past
and future is irrelevant—no change in facts and no change in lawmaker.
Future consequences always depend upon future conditions, whereas past
consequences and conduct depend upon nothing; they are complete. It is
often appropriate to impute to investors an assumption of the risk that the
future will differ from the past, but not that the past does not turn out to be
what it was.
The considerations developed here also suggest that the newer
transitions literature has not offered much by way of advance over the older
view. I have argued that two pillars of the new view – the ideas that legal
transitions are closely akin to market changes and that an appeal to reliance
interests is circular – are importantly mistaken. Once one removes these
pillars, it is not clear that much remains of the new view’s general
prescriptive edifice. Whether a rule of no relief is appropriate in the
legislative setting would seem to depend, as it always has, on whether it
made sense for those subject to the old rule to rely on its persistence. In
other words, it is a question that cannot be answered apart from an
examination of the facts in any particular case. Similarly, whether a
difference in default rule ought to obtain between legislative and judicial
action would seem to depend, as it always has, on the significance of the
distinction between making law and finding it.142
Where does all of this leave us? Prior to the development of the
new view, the general orientation of the transitions literature seems to have
been that the question of the appropriate transition rule was to be answered
on a case-by-case basis.143 In other words, the idea that there might an
optimal transition norm seems not to have been entertained. The newer
literature seeks, instead, to develop a framework for analysis that largely
eschews any examination of the particular circumstances of any given

142. See Munzer, supra note 59, at 374–75.
143. This is the general assumption that Cohen makes. See Novick & Petersberger,
supra note 122, at 500.
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change in favor of a search for transition norms. The arguments developed
in this Article suggest, however, that the question of the optimal transition
norm is no more meaningful than is the question, “What is the best law?”
Neither can be answered in the abstract, because neither is a question of
norms. Rather, each is a question that must be approached in light of
circumstances, and addressed to the new challenges as they arise.

